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In response to rising consumer bankruptcy filing rates, federal bankruptcy reform 
under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Prevention Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA) reduced households’ demand for bankruptcy through a variety of measures 
that made it less generous.  To evaluate impacts of reform beyond plummeting filing 
rates, this study introduces a unique dataset of Utah bankruptcy filers from 2003-2007 
that reveals changing consumer characteristics and outcomes during the bankruptcy 
process. 
Compared to the state’s general population, households in the bankruptcy sample 
have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, more unmarried individuals, and lower home 
ownership rates.  More of the debtors filing since BAPCPA attempted partial repayment 
under Chapter 13 rather than seeking a Chapter 7 discharge.  Cases under both chapters 
took longer to complete and were more likely to be dismissed.  Households entering 
bankruptcy postreform were more likely to have a recent debt collection proceeding 
before filing and a subsequent bankruptcy after filing.  The percentage of medical debt 
rose and share of credit card debt fell for cases filed under BAPCPA compared to before.  
Among Chapter 7 filers, we observe higher income and more households with nonexempt 
assets.  Chapter 13 cases postreform exhibit a lower share of secured debt and the 





Relative to those filing for the first time in 8 years, repeat bankruptcy filers were 
more likely to have children, mortgages, and medical debt.  BAPCPA appears to have 
reduced repeat filings.  Self-employed, repeat bankruptcy filers in large households with 
an income-earning spouse tended to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7.  More income 
and student loans are also associated with preferring Chapter 13.  Married filers with 
higher levels of debt, particularly medical and secured debt, are more likely to file jointly 
than individually, as are filers with government assistance as an income source.  Joint 
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Examining the characteristics of households going through the bankruptcy 
process provides a window into choices made by people in financial distress as they 
navigate a legal system offering conditional relief from debt collection.  Extensive reform 
of bankruptcy law in 2005 creates an opportunity to study bankruptcy behavior under 
contrasting regimes.  In 2011, an individual was as likely to file bankruptcy as graduate 
from college or file for divorce (Porter, 2012).  The singularity that year in the number of 
consumer bankruptcy filings shown in Figure 1.1 is one metric of the impact of 
bankruptcy reform, which was intended to curb the long-term trend of increased 
bankruptcy filings.  
This study employs an original dataset of bankruptcy filings from a particular 
judicial district with a high filing rate to shed light on the consumer bankruptcy 
experience and evaluate bankruptcy policy.  Utah households in bankruptcy before and 
after the reform are different from those in other states in terms of their characteristics 
upon entering bankruptcy (e.g., income and assets) and their experience during the 
bankruptcy process (e.g., percent of debt discharged and likelihood of successful 
completion).  Revealing comparisons are discovered between households filing with the 
Utah bankruptcy court and those remaining outside of bankruptcy in the state and in the 
U.S.  Attention is given to the causes of disparities in filing rates between states.  This  




Figure 1.1: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 1986 Q1 to 2012 Q3 
Data source:  American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) 
study’s original positive analysis gives rise to normative implications worthy of future 
study. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 
intended to encourage debtor responsibility by an income-based rule and additional 
procedural requirements (Lawless, Littwin, Porter, & Pottow, 2008).  The passage of the 
law was achieved with support from the credit industry and in spite of opposition from 
consumer advocates and bankruptcy attorneys.  Under its many provisions, less debt 
relief is available to consumers “across the board” (Jacoby, 2005, p. 173).  A means test 
increases scrutiny and makes the simpler and more generous Chapter 7 option 
unavailable to most debtors with above-median incomes. BAPCPA requires bankruptcy 
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filers to attend a debt counseling course, pay higher filing fees, and submit additional 
documents as proof of their financial standing.  Access to bankruptcy relief is also 
restricted for people who filed a bankruptcy case previously.  The types of debt that 
cannot be discharged during bankruptcy are expanded somewhat.  Additional protections 
are instituted for creditors with loans secured by collateral.  In cases where partial 
repayment of debts is required, the determination of the minimum amount to be paid is 
better defined.  Key provisions of BAPCPA with excerpts from the law are explained in 
more detail in the Appendix. 
The purpose of BAPCPA is to detect and dissuade bankruptcy filers who are 
capable of servicing their obligations without bankruptcy.  The reform has been viewed 
as “part of a broader contraction of the social safety net,” referring to efforts to reduce 
redistributive spending over the past two decades (Littwin, 2011).  Means testing alone, 
even if stringent, was seen as unlikely to generate more than a slight decline in the 
bankruptcy filing rate in the long run (Athreya, 2002).  If this earlier prediction is correct, 
the observed dramatic decline in filing rates following BAPCPA may be either attributed 
to the law’s provisions outside of means testing or characterized as a short-term reaction 
while attorneys and debtors learn the new system.  Liquidity constrained debtors since 
BAPCPA find it more difficult to afford bankruptcy (Gross, Notowidigdo, & Wang, 
2012).  Also, the reduction in the filing rate accompanying BAPCPA has been described 
as merely shifting the problems of default away from bankruptcy courts without 
prompting financial responsibility, relegating debtors in distress to address default 
outside the court system (Ausubel & Dawsey, 2004; Lawless et al., 2008). 
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Consumer Credit, Delinquency, and Bankruptcy 
Debt balances and delinquency rates for major types of debt measure demand for 
bankruptcy.  They help explain the bankruptcy filing rate and allow comparisons of Utah 
households’ credit situations to that of households in other states.  As indicated by Figure 
1.2, Utah households take on heavier debt burdens than U.S. households.  Such 
borrowing would be expected of a young population like Utah’s, where average family 
size is greater than in other states.  Total mortgage, auto, and credit card debt balances 
per capita were an average of $2,399 or 5.3% higher in Utah than in the U.S. for the 
period 2003-2007.1  The rise in bankruptcy filing rates over time has been attributed to 
increased credit access, particularly for households with low income and wealth (Moss & 
Johnson, 1999). 
Utahns generally carried higher levels of per capita mortgage and auto debt than 
people in other states, 10.4% and 5.1% more, respectively, on average for the period 
1999-2010 (see Figure 1.3).  This likely has contributed to Utah’s high bankruptcy rate 
compared to the rest of the country.  On the other hand, credit card debt per capita is 
11.3% lower in Utah than in the U.S. at large.  While credit card debt balances ($3,088 
per capita in Utah for 2005) are considerably lower than the other two categories 
($40,243 combined), credit card debt is more likely to be discharged in bankruptcy.  For 
these debt categories, as with the total per capita debt burden from Figure 1.2, it would be 
difficult to identify the cause of the decrease in debt levels observed from 2007 to 2008.   
                                                 
1 Mortgage, auto, and credit card debt are the three largest consumer debt categories.  Types of consumer 
debt not represented by these data from the New York Federal Reserve Bank are student loans, revolving 
home equity, and other debts that together amounted to 13.7% of total U.S. consumer debt in 2005. 
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Figure 1.2:  Real Consumer Debt per Capita, U.S. and Utah, 1999-2010 
Year-end balances of mortgage, auto, and credit card debt, 2010 dollars 
Data source:  New York Federal Reserve Bank, Debt Balance per Capita 
BAPCPA policy may have exerted a negative effect on demand for credit, even as the 
major financial crisis reduced both supply and demand for credit. 
Despite the high per capita debt burdens in Utah, delinquency rates in the state 
during 2003-2007 are not obviously higher than the national average for the three largest 
consumer debt categories taken together: mortgages (0.4% higher in Utah), auto loans 
(52.6% lower), and credit card debt (35.7% lower).  For Utah and the U.S., credit card 
debt consistently has a higher 90-day delinquency rate than mortgage and auto loans.  
Delinquency data do not explain the surge in bankruptcy filings in 2005 or the subsequent 
drop in demand for bankruptcy under the post-BAPCPA regime.  However, Figure 1.4 
does seem to explain the rise in bankruptcy filing rates that happened in 2007 and beyond  
  6 
  
 
Figure 1.3:  Real Consumer Debt per Capita by Type, U.S. and Utah, 1999-2010 
Year-end balances of mortgage, auto, and credit card debt in 2010 dollars 
Data source:  New York Federal Reserve Bank, Debt Balance per Capita 
 
Figure 1.4:  Delinquent Consumer Debt by Type, U.S. and Utah, 1999-2010 
Balances at least 90 days late as a percent of total balance by category 
Data source:  NY Federal Reserve, Percent of Debt 90+ Days Delinquent 
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as exceptional credit market conditions fueled at least a short-term rise in bankruptcy 
filings in spite of the sweeping reforms that made consumer bankruptcy less attractive 
than it had been in Utah and the U.S. 
Trends in consumer indebtedness and delinquency help explain the bankruptcy 
filing rate in the U.S.  The rising personal bankruptcy filing rate leading up to 2005 (see 
Figure 1.1) seems to correspond to rising levels of real consumer debt better than 
measures of debt delinquency, shown in Figure 1.5—namely foreclosure rates and the 
percent of loan balances over 90 days late—which remained fairly steady.  The graph 
shows no substantial changes in consumer debt or 90-day delinquency corresponding to 
the October 2005 drop in bankruptcy filings.  Levels of real consumer debt did not taper 
until 2008, and not until 2010 did delinquency rates reverse their upward climb, which 
had begun following BAPCPA implementation. 
Indebtedness, delinquency, and foreclosures are indicators of the underlying 
demand for the type of debt relief bankruptcy can provide.  We have seen that 
delinquency and foreclosure rates were fairly stable in the years before BAPCPA 
implementation, while bankruptcy rates rose nonetheless, along with debt per capita.  
None of the three variables explain the anomalies in the bankruptcy filing rate that 
accompanied BAPCPA implementation.  The bankruptcy rate fell from an average of 
0.25% (2004 to 2005) to 0.11% (2006 to 2007) of U.S. consumers.  Unprecedented rises 
in delinquencies and foreclosures, reaching more than triple their former levels, seem to 
have pressed bankruptcy filings upward from the new low up to an average of 0.19% 
from 2008 to 2012.  Since 2005, the bankruptcy filing rate peaked in the second quarter 
of 2010 at 0.29%. 
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Figure 1.5:  Delinquency and Real Consumer Debt, U.S., 1999 Q1 to 2012 Q3 
Debt at least 90 days late as a percent of total household debt (line, right axis)  
Household debt per person with a credit report (columns, left axis) 
Data source:  New York Federal Reserve Bank 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings are often prompted by people’s desire to protect 
their homes from foreclosure.  In this way, home owners intend to cure mortgage arrears 
while foreclosure is stalled by the automatic stay.  From 1999 through 2004, quarterly 
bankruptcy rates for Chapters 7 and 13 track fairly well with foreclosure rates, with 
bankruptcy rates on average 3.1 times greater than foreclosure rates.2  However, as we 
see in Figure 1.6, a spike in the bankruptcy rate in 2005 to 0.39% and a subsequent drop 
were not preceded by commensurate movement in the foreclosure rate.  Even the 
exceptionally high foreclosure rates that began to emerge in 2007 did not result in 
bankruptcy rates reaching pre-2005 levels.  From 2006 through 2011, the bankruptcy rate  
                                                 
2 Bankruptcy is a substitute for foreclosure, yet, for example, as economic conditions improve, 
homeowners’ finances, bankruptcy filings, and foreclosures would fall together. 
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Figure 1.6:  Foreclosures and Bankruptcies, U.S., 1999 Q2 to 2012 Q3 
New foreclosures and bankruptcies, percent of population with credit report 
Data source:  New York Federal Reserve Bank 
was an average of 1.1 times the foreclosure rate.  The two rates seemed to follow each 
other at this closer distance during that period, although some separation of the 
bankruptcy rate above the foreclosure rate is noticeable since 2010. 
Borrowing behavior and debt delinquency are a function of bankruptcy policy, 
among other variables.  In the face of BAPCPA reforms, households expecting less relief 
in the event they need to file bankruptcy would tend to borrow less and default on loans 
less often.  On the other hand, banks would tend to lend more freely, knowing consumer 
bankruptcy is more expensive and less attractive to debtors than before, meaning the risk 
of repayment is lower. 
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The Consumer Bankruptcy Process:  Chapters 7 and 13 
Historically rooted in Western civilization, bankruptcy is sanctioned by the U.S. 
constitution.  The role of bankruptcy is to balance distressed debtors’ need for assistance 
with unpaid creditors’ right to collect.  Various modern concepts of bankruptcy’s 
functions include providing a fresh start for encumbered debtors, penalizing deviant 
consumer behavior, helping creditors collect debt, allocating limited funds among 
competing creditors, and creating a type of consumption insurance (McGregor, 
Klingander, & Lown, 2001; Ramsay, 1997; Zywicki, 2005).  U.S. bankruptcy law has 
adapted over time as priorities reflect the economic climate and cultural values. 
Bankruptcy allows anyone to apply to the court for full or partial relief from their 
debts.  The court determines whether to discharge debts, thus permitting legalized 
default.  During the time a bankruptcy case is pending, the “automatic stay” protects 
debtors from solicitation or collection by creditors, and debtors only must pay creditors in 
accordance with court decisions.  There are some limits to bankruptcy relief.  Certain 
types of debt are considered nondischargeable, such as taxes and student loans.  
Payments on debts secured by collateral must be kept current for debtors to retain assets 
pledged as collateral.  Debtors may voluntarily reaffirm a debt contract as an exception to 
a general discharge received. 
The vast majority of consumer bankruptcy cases are either Chapter 7 or Chapter 
13, referring to the chapter of US Code Title 11 to which the bankruptcy filer appeals.  
Debtors, usually under advisement from their attorneys, choose the chapter under which 
they will file bankruptcy.  A Chapter 7 discharge involves the liquidation of any 
nonexempt assets owned by bankruptcy filers.  In only 16.3% of Chapter 7 cases filed in 
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Utah between 2003 and 2007 were there any nonexempt assets.  Even in those cases, the 
assets were rarely valuable enough for the court to appoint a trustee to oversee their 
liquidation.  Chapter 13 cases involve partial repayment of as much debt as the court 
deems filers can afford over a 3- or 5-year period, after which all nonexempt debt is 
discharged.  To meet this requirement, filers must have an ongoing source of income.  
Chapter 13 filers are not expected to relinquish their assets to pay debt—and virtually all 
of them have nonexempt assets to protect.  They need only to make satisfactory progress 
on a court-approved repayment plan.  Chapter 7 is more common and more favorable for 
most filers because it requires no repayment.  Also, Chapter 7 cases are typically 
completed in 6 months, while Chapter 13 repayment plans are designed to last about 5 
years.  A small percentage of filers switch to the other chapter after opening their case. 
Filing fees differ by chapter.  During the 2 years before BAPCPA reform, the 
Chapter 7 filing fee was $209, and the Chapter 13 filing fee was $194.  BAPCPA created 
a larger differential in filing fees: Chapter 7 $274 and Chapter 13 $189.  Finally, 14 
months after BAPCPA reform, a major adjustment in fees tended towards equalization: 
Chapter 7 $299 and Chapter 13 $274.  Charges for amendments, trustee withholdings, 
and mandatory debt counseling are separate from these initial filing fees. 
Cross-State Filing Rates 
What explains the wide variation in consumer bankruptcy filing rates among 
states?  To explore cross-state bankruptcy differences, the 20 variables in Table 1.1 were 
selected based on the literature on filing rate differences among the states.  Of the 
demographic, financial, and policy variables, nine are significant in exploratory 
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Table 1.1:  State Bankruptcy Filing Rate as Dependent Variable 









Average Household Size 0.261 
(0.907) 
3.08 2.62 





Single (Never Married) Percent of 




Divorced, Separated or Widowed as a 










Median Age -0.253 
(0.135) 
28.4 36.4 
Percent of Population Age 25 and 





   
 





Home Ownership Rate 0.056 
(0.387) 
73.5% 68.6% 
Unemployment Rate, Annual 0.718* 
(0.037) 
2.9% 4.6% 
Poverty Rate 0.323* 
(0.003) 
10.6% 13.3% 
Median Household Income, Thousands -0.122* 
(0.008) 
$54,628 $48,201 
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Payday Lending Is Legal† 0.577 
(0.510) 
Yes Yes 
in 40 states 
State Garnishment Restrictions Limit 




in 28 states 
Exemption for Personal Property of a 
Married Couple, Thousands† 
-0.019 
(0.301) 
$16,000 Above $16,00 
in 38 states 
Exemption for Primary Residence of 
a Married Couple, Thousands † 
-0.007 
(0.081) 
$40,000 Above $40,000 
in 23 states 
Public Safety Net, Thousands‡ -0.260* 
(0.004) 
$7,005 $9,543 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings as a 




* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† These four variables, from Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), are only available for 2000.  Unlimited 
primary residence exemptions are entered as $250,000. 
‡ Public Safety Net equals total state spending on Unemployment Insurance, Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families, Food Stamps, and Medicaid divided by the number of people in poverty. 
Notes:  (1) The dependent variable is consumer bankruptcy filings per 1,000 households.  (2) Several 
of the U.S. values are population-weighted means of state values, a calculation shown to be very 
accurate in the five cases where calculated and government-reported values were both readily 
available.  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide data for most of these variables for the bankruptcy sample and 
the general populations of Utah and the U.S., in some cases with more years given. 
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univariate regressions with the state consumer bankruptcy filing rate as the dependent 
variable.  The year 2006 chosen for this brief analysis falls within the period of our study 
and is postreform.3  Values of independent variables are given for Utah and the U.S., 
which had filing rates of 6.4 and 5.2 per thousand households, respectively, in a year 
when Utah had the 12th highest rate among the states.4 
Demographic variables help explain cross-state filing rate variation.  The 
relationship between household size and the filing rate is positive but not significant (see 
Table 1.1).  Similarly, Lown and Rowe (2003) did not find conclusive evidence of the 
positive relationship expected with a higher ratio of dependents to adults.  Yet household 
size is related to median household income and income per capita, both of which are 
significant.  As for marital status, states with higher percentages of divorced, separated, 
and widowed individuals have higher bankruptcy filing rates, which we would expect 
since family transitions cause financial disruption (Fay, Hurst, & White, 2002).  A 1991 
survey found that 15% of bankruptcy filers reported marital disruption as the cause of 
their financial difficulty (Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000).  We can surmise that 
Utah’s filing rate would be even higher if the state were not below the national 
percentage for divorced, separated, and widowed individuals at 14.1% versus 19.2% 
(Table 1.1).  States with a higher percentage of married or single (never married) 
individuals do not have significantly different filing rates in this analysis, although 
marriage has been found to increase the likelihood of bankruptcy (Agarwal, 
                                                 
3 Multivariate regression analysis based on panel data would be more adequate than single-year, univariate 
regressions.  Data are readily available for all but the policy variables were this analysis to be extended 
with more data points.  The table provides exploratory treatment of the cross-state filing issue, while most 
of the dissertation uses household data of bankruptcy filers.  
4 See Figure 1.7 for U.S. and Utah filing rates for more years than 2006. 
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Chomsisengphet, & Liu, 2011).  States with a greater proportion of Blacks experience 
higher bankruptcy filing rates.  In Utah, 0.9% of the population is Black, far below the 
national average of 12.4%.  At 11.2%, the Hispanic population of Utah is closer to the 
percent nationwide of 14.8%.  This variable’s relationship to the consumer bankruptcy 
rate is inverse but not significant.  Utah’s young median age of 28.4 is far below the U.S. 
median of 36.4.  A younger population appears to be associated with higher filing rates 
among states, but the result is not significant.  Finally, lower filing rates are present 
where a higher percentage of the population has a bachelor’s degree, consistent with 
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009).  This result is favorable to Utah, where 19.2% of adults 25 
and over have bachelor’s degrees, compared to 17.1% nationwide. 
Most of the state financial characteristics in Table 1.1 have significant 
relationships to bankruptcy filing rates by state.  In the literature, medical events are a 
contributing factor in a majority of bankruptcies (Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, & 
Woolhandler, 2005; Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, & Woolhandler, 2009).  Substantial 
medical debt makes filing more likely (Domowitz & Sartain, 1999).5  The percent of a 
state’s population lacking health insurance is a significant predictor of debt delinquency 
and a positive, but not significant, predictor of bankruptcy filing (Gross & Souleles, 
2002).  In our results, the health insurance variable does not seem to capture the impact of 
medical events and debt on bankruptcy.  Health measures that perhaps would be valuable 
in this regard are disease incidence, birth rates, and life expectancy. 
                                                 
5 Domowitz and Sartain (1999) classified medical debt as substantial if it amounts to more than 2% of 
income, sufficient to account for 30% of bankruptcies in 1994. 
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Representing a major financial resource and more affordable credit access, home 
ownership should reduce filing rates, as suggested in Table 1.1.  However, home 
ownership rates are not significant here.  Although homes with equity and affordable 
payments are financial anchors, changes in housing prices, questionable mortgage terms, 
and home purchases beyond owners’ earnings could instead make home ownership a 
financial burden.  Poverty and unemployment rates, both of which are low in Utah, tend 
to be higher in states with more bankruptcy filings.  As for income, both measures are 
inversely related to the filing rate, and Utah had high median household income and low 
income per capita compared to other states.  Utah’s large household size seems to 
account for the state’s below average income per capita, based on a high dependency 
ratio.  Median household income is not skewed by large incomes that do not reflect the 
middle class and lower income groups most common in bankruptcy.6 
Collection law and the legal culture for bankruptcy differ by state (White, 1998B; 
Braucher, 1993).  BAPCPA’s tightening of state domiciliary requirements emphasizes the 
concern that strategic bankruptcy filers can shop for a favorable jurisdiction.  Based on 
their judges, trustees, and attorneys, judicial districts differ from each other in various 
dimensions: lenience in receiving Chapter 7 cases (rather than Chapter 13), repayment 
expectations under Chapter 13 (which affects completion rates), repeat filing rates, and 
the relative priority given to unsecured and secured creditors in making distributions of 
debtors’ assets (Norberg & Compo, 2007).  Meanwhile, state-determined collection laws 
affect borrowing, default, and bankruptcy. 
                                                 
6 The highest annual income in a random sample of 200 Utah bankruptcy cases 2003-2007 was $86,000. 
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Of the state policy variables in Table 1.1, the filing rate is lower in states with 
more public safety net spending, reinforcing the view that bankruptcy must be understood 
as a substitute for other elements of the broader social safety net (Littwin, 2011; 
McGregor et al., 2001).  As expected, since aggressive garnishment drives debtors to 
bankruptcy, filing rates are lower where state garnishment laws limit the amount creditors 
can collect beyond the federal standard (Berry & Wise, 2012; Lefgren & McIntyre, 
2009).  Bankruptcy filers are more likely than the general population to use extremely 
expensive credit, such as payday loans, presumably because they do not have better 
options (Han & Li, 2011).  However, in this analysis, states without restrictions on 
payday lending did not seem to have higher bankruptcy rates.  In any case, payday loans 
are not a very common type of unsecured debt among households in bankruptcy, with 
payday loans amounting to merely 1.3% of unsecured debt for our sample, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  Our preliminary analysis does not show that generous exemptions attract 
more people to bankruptcy, a result contrary to Ausubel and Dawsey (2001), but 
consistent with Agarwal et al. (2011) and Lefgren and McIntyre (2009).  A high 
percentage of Chapter 13 cases is a strong indicator for high bankruptcy filing rates, 
presumably because of the augmented rate of repeat filings under Chapter 13 compared 
to Chapter 7 (Lown & Rowe, 2003).  Incidentally, 2006 was the only year in the past 
decade when Utah’s percent of Chapter 13 consumer bankruptcies was below the national 
percentage.  Thus, if this positive relationship (between the share of Chapter 13 cases and 
overall consumer bankruptcy filing rates) holds true among the states for years other than 
2006, it could explain Utah’s high bankruptcy filing rate historically, though further 
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analysis would be needed to determine whether the share of Chapter 13 cases had the 
expected effect on Utah’s 2006 filing rate, which apparently it did not. 
Consumer Bankruptcy in Utah 
Utah is an interesting place to study bankruptcy.  As Figure 1.7 reveals, household 
filing rates in the state have uniformly exceeded national rates for three decades.  This 
outcome has been ascribed to the state’s unique demographics of young families and 
many children, below-average per capita income, high mortgage payments as a percent of 
income, generous charitable giving, and high rates of entrepreneurship (Johnson & 
Wright, 2007; Lown & Rowe, 2003).  Compared to other states, Utah has typical 
exemption allowances for protecting basic debtor assets from repossession by creditors 
(Lefgren & McIntyre, 2009).  Utah is one of seven states that allow payday lending 
without ceilings on fees and interest rates (Prager, 2009).  The state has a similar number 
of pawnshops and payday lending locations as other states (Prager, 2009).  The percent of 
Utah bankruptcy filings made under Chapter 13 is higher than the national figure by up to 
10% for every year but one during the period 1999 to 2008 (Lown & Rowe, 2003; United 
States Trustee Program [USTP], 2010).  Also, the share of Utahns with subprime or no 
credit scores is in the range of 20% to 30% by county, which is comparable to the 
national average (Prager, 2009).  Utah’s bankruptcy court receives more proposals for 
some debt repayment in bankruptcy compared to most other courts in the country, where 
partial repayment is not attempted as frequently (Lown & Rowe, 2003). 
Consistent with national trends, a dramatic decline in the Utah bankruptcy filing 
rate occurred when BAPCPA bankruptcy reform took effect in October 2005 (see Figure 
1.7).  From 2005 to 2006, the Utah consumer bankruptcy filing rate fell 76.3%, a  
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Figure 1.7:  Bankruptcy Filing Rate, U.S. and Utah, 1980-2011 
Utah’s rank among 51 states shows at the base of the columns. 
Data sources: Filing data, American Bankruptcy Institute; 
household counts, American Community Survey (ACS) 
somewhat deeper plunge than that of U.S. as a whole (71.6%).  From November 2002 
through October 2005, Utah filings averaged 1,874 per month.  In contrast, postreform 
filing levels averaged 533 per month from November 2006 through October 2009.  This 
outcome is striking, since major bankruptcy reform in 1938 and 1979 had little effect on 
filing rates7 (Lawless, 2007).  To an extent, economic expansions since the 1980s have 
stalled or even momentarily reversed the upward climb in filing rates, but the modest 
expansion underway from 2002-2007 is not sufficient to explain what occurred in late 
2005.  From 2008 to the present, there was a resurgence in filings, averaging 1,260 cases 
per month from 2008 through 2012 and reaching above 2,000 per month in 2011.  This 
                                                 
7 Some factors in the greater filing rate impact associated with the recent reform, compared to those in 1938 
and 1979, are the exceptional level of publicity for the 2005 reform and the fact that it represented a 
retrenchment in bankruptcy relief afforded. 
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reversal certainly is connected to the historically deep recession that began December 
2007 and the financial crisis that had become disruptive by September 2008.8  Figure 1.7 
shows that the household filing rate for Utah was consistently above 2.5% for the 5 years 
preceding BAPCPA.  Since the 2005 reform, the state’s filing rate has ranged from 0.5% 
to 2.0%.  It remains to be seen what bankruptcy rates will be under BAPCPA after the 
dramatic drop the first couple of years, closely followed by a steady rise that coincided 
with poor macroeconomic performance, which rise tapered and reversed course in 2011 
and 2012. 
Figure 1.8 shows Utah bankruptcy filings during a narrower time period, October 
2003 to October 2007, reaching 24 months before and after BAPCPA took effect.  In the 
weeks leading up to BAPCPA implementation, financially distressed households rushed 
to file their bankruptcy petitions under the familiar and more lenient existing law, leading 
to abnormally high filing rates.  National media coverage and powerful financial 
incentives resulted in long lines at some courthouses as the reform deadline approached.  
After that brief irregularity and an associated subsequent 3- to 4-month period of 
extremely low filing rates, a stable flow of bankruptcy filings set in at an average of 488  
                                                 
8 October 2003 to October 2007 was a period of economic recovery with the monthly Utah unemployment 
rate falling from 5.5% to 3.0% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS).  For sake of comparison, from December 
1986 to April 1989, the Utah unemployment rate fell from 7% to 4.5% with no major change in bankruptcy 
policy.  The number of consumer bankruptcy cases filed increased by 30.4% from 1987 to 1989, apparently 
paying little heed to the business cycle improvement (American Bankruptcy Institute, ABI).  Another 
unemployment rate analogy is the steady reduction in the Utah unemployment rate from 5.1% in April 
1992 to 3.1% in March 1997, while the number of consumer bankruptcy cases increased by 53.2%.  From 
1980 to 2011, the standard deviation in the annual percent change in the number of Utah filings was 23.7% 
(and only 15.7% from 1980 to 2004).  The 82% decline in filings associated with BAPCPA was singular.  
By 2011, 6 years after BAPCPA and after the most severe U.S. recession in decades, the number of 
consumer bankruptcy filings in Utah had risen to over 1,500 per month, 85% of prereform levels.  Besides 
the recession, Utah’s population had grown 11% (Census).  Although it is difficult to unravel various 
demographic and macroeconomic causes of bankruptcy, which is not the object of this study, BAPCPA 
reform had a marked short-term effect on the choice to file for bankruptcy in Utah, and perhaps a 
significant long-term impact as well. 
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Figure 1.8: Monthly Bankruptcy Filings, Utah, Oct 2003 to Oct 2007 
Chapter 7 and 13 cases filed 24 months before or after BAPCPA reform 
filings per month, approximately 28% of prereform levels.  To a certain extent, BAPCPA 
reform merely shifted bankruptcy demand forward in time as individuals contemplating 
bankruptcy timed their filings sooner than they would have without the policy incentive.  
Nonetheless, the spike in filings is dwarfed by the subsequent decline in the filing rate, 
suggesting a fundamental and lasting impact in addition to short-term volatility.  Further 
research beyond this study’s time horizon will help address the long-term implications of 
reform on the filing rate. 
The decline in filing rates raises questions about what types of households no 
longer chose to file for bankruptcy under the new law.  The transition to the new legal 
regime may have induced changes in debtor behavior both outside and inside of 
bankruptcy as bankruptcy relief becomes less accessible under BAPCPA. 
  





Bankruptcy studies are published in a variety of economics, consumer, law, 
finance, and medical journals.  Most of the research explores the decision to file for 
bankruptcy.  For example, Domowitz and Sartain (1999) used a sample of US households 
in and out of bankruptcy to evaluate the importance of demographic and financial 
characteristics of households in their decision of whether to file for bankruptcy and in the 
choice of bankruptcy chapter for those who do.  With bankruptcy filing statistics by zip 
code, Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) focused on how the filing rate in each state is affected 
by policy variables, such as exemption allowances, garnishment laws, and welfare 
spending.  White (1998A) estimated from 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances data the 
proportion of households that would benefit from filing for bankruptcy, which ranged 
from 15% to 50% based on different criteria, larger by any method than the 8% of 
households that chose to file.  Based on court records for bankruptcy cases from 2007 
accompanied by questionnaire responses, Himmelstein et al. (2009) concluded that at 
least 62% of bankruptcy filings can be considered “medical bankruptcies” because 
income disruption or additional expenses affected individuals who recently experienced 
medical events, such as personal injury or childbirth. 
Relatively fewer bankruptcy studies focus on the characteristics and behavior of 
households already in bankruptcy.  Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) presented a 
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landmark study based on court documents filed by about 1,500 households in bankruptcy 
in five different states during 1981 to learn about the circumstances of these people.  
Sullivan et al. later updated their study for 1991 and 2001 debtors (Sullivan, Warren, & 
Westbrook, 1994; Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2006).  Norberg and Velkey (2006) 
created a dataset of 795 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in 1994 in seven judicial 
districts and conveyed a thorough review of the characteristics and outcomes for 
households in the sample.  Norberg (1999) turned to a district in Mississippi to 
investigate income, demographics, dismissal, and bankruptcy abuse for 71 filers in the 
1990s.  For the state of Delaware, Zhu (2011) likewise used court records to evaluate the 
behavior of bankrupt households (n=3,395), including insights into their financial status, 
adverse life events, and assets. 
Several studies review the circumstances of debtors who filed cases in Utah in 
1997.  Llewellyn and Lown (2005) investigated repeat bankruptcies for 2,194 cases, 
finding evidence of likely abuse of the bankruptcy system for 10.7% of the households, 
based on the timing and chapter of repeat filings, an increase over the 1981 estimate of 
5.0% for cases filed in other states (Sullivan et al., 1989).  Lown and Rowe (2003) 
performed a sweeping review of demographic and financial characteristics of 2,567 filers, 
focusing on differences between those who chose Chapters 7 and 13.  Chapter 13 filers 
had more income, debt, and children than Chapter 7 filers.  Evans and Lown (2008) 
employed logistic regressions to evaluate the likelihood of case completion for 
households in Chapter 13, the majority of which do not complete their cases. 
Bankruptcy filers have less income and assets and more expenses and debts 
compared to households that do not file for bankruptcy (Sullivan et al., 1994).  
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Households often delay unduly in filing bankruptcy as their financial woes, which may 
already have been beyond their ability to correct independently, become more intractable 
and costly to society.  Debt repayment is impractical without at least some relief, and 
most individuals who receive bankruptcy relief still repay a large share of their loans 
(Sullivan et al., 1989).  Yet a subset of filers are found to have sufficient wealth and 
earning potential to repay much more of their debts than bankruptcy law requires of them 
(White, 1998A).  Postbankruptcy, households face reduced access to credit compared to 
households without a bankruptcy in the past 10 years: fewer loan approvals, higher 
interest rates, and lower credit limits (Fisher & Lyons, 2010; Han & Li, 2011).  In the 
labor market, a significant reduction in earnings is observed up to a decade after 
bankruptcy while controlling for an array of household characteristics, adverse events, 
and policy variables (Maroto, 2012). 
Educational attainment affects the decision to file bankruptcy.  Heads of 
household with more years of education were significantly less likely to declare 
bankruptcy between 1984 and 1995 in the presence of wide-ranging controls9 (Fay et al., 
2002).  U.S. zip codes with a higher percentage of college graduates had significantly 
lower bankruptcy rates 1999-2001, also with a variety of controls10 (Lefgren & McIntyre, 
2009).  Meanwhile, the percentage of high school graduates was a positive but not 
significant predictor of the zip code filing rate.  In contrast to the two studies previously 
mentioned, Himmelstein et al. (2009) found in their research focused on the medical 
                                                 
9 Controls in Fay et al. (2002) include income, employment, home ownership, marital status, age, health 
problems, divorce, financial benefit from bankruptcy, debts, business ownership, local filing rates, 
attorneys per capita, and state dummies. 
10 Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) employ the following controls: income, employment, home ownership, 
race, marital status, age, sex, urban versus rural, state exemptions and garnishment restrictions, the local 
percent of Chapter 13 filings, and restrictions on payday lenders. 
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causes of bankruptcy that attending college was not significant to the decision to file 
bankruptcy in 2001 and 2007 when controlling for age, marital status, home ownership, 
health insurance, and income.  We acquire a more nuanced view of the impact of 
education on bankruptcy filing rates from three other studies.  Compared to the general 
population, bankruptcy filers since BAPCPA implementation are more likely to have 
started college without graduating and less likely to have a college degree or higher (Han 
& Li, 2011; O’Malley & Huston, 2012).  The pronounced nonlinearity indicating more 
bankruptcy filings for “some college” in Table 2.1 confirm the intuitive financial 
consequences of college success. 
Agarwal et al. (2011) find from credit card data that age is a significant positive 
predictor of loan default and bankruptcy in regressions with a large set of other financial 
and demographic variables, while coefficients for age squared are negative, identifying a 
weakening or reversal of the positive correlation between age and bankruptcy in later 
years.  Fay et al. (2002) confirm these results with respect to filing bankruptcy based on a 
large panel dataset from a longitudinal survey.  Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) employ 
finer age categories with zip code level filing data to show that populations with a higher 
fraction of people ages 25-29 have significantly higher bankruptcy filing rates, while a 
higher fraction of people ages 30-39 has a significant negative effect on filing rates. 
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) identify a possible decrease in bankruptcy filing 
rates (10% significance level) for zip codes with higher percentages of female household 
heads.  Similarly, Sullivan et al. (1989) find for cases filed in 1981 that women were 
slightly under-represented in seeking bankruptcy relief, at 47% of bankruptcy petitioners 
and 40% of separate (not joint) bankruptcy filings.  Based on that study, women in 
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Table 2.1:  Educational Attainment by Bankruptcy Filing Status, 
Three Nationwide Studies 
2008 survey of individuals born 





High school or less 52.1% 53.5% 
Some college and associates degree 33.8% 25.1% 
Bachelor's degree and higher 14.1% 21.4% 
   






High school or less 52.0% 40.7% 
Some college 25.1% 17.9% 
College 22.9% 41.4% 
   
2007 CBP and U.S. Census ‡ Filed Bankruptcy U.S. Population 
High school or less 41.1% 46.6% 
Some college 43.4% 27.2% 
College 15.5% 26.2% 
† Individuals born 1957-1964 enrolled in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth were 
asked in 2004 and 2008 whether or not they ever filed bankruptcy (O’Malley & Huston, 
2012; n=12,686). 
†† Individuals of any adult age surveyed between 1998 and 2007 for the Survey of 
Consumer Finances are classified as filers or nonfilers based on whether they ever filed for 
bankruptcy prior to the survey (Han & Li, 2011; n=13,144). 
‡ Individuals filing bankruptcy in 2007 surveyed for the Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
(n=2,314) compared to the general U.S. population from the U.S. Census (Porter, 2012). 
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bankruptcy, like women in the general population, have less than men in mean earnings, 
assets, and debt, but with relatively high standard deviations.  A study of 1991 filers 
indicates that women accounted for an even 50% of separate bankruptcy filings from 
three bankruptcy districts (Sullivan et al., 2000).  Of 5,441 Nebraska filings from 1996 
and 1997, 51.9% were women, including 54.5% of separate filings (Pollack, 1997). 
The racial composition of neighborhoods is found to affect filing rates, while 
controlling for income, educational attainment, unemployment rates, and other 
demographic and financial variables (Lefgren & McIntyre, 2009).  The percentage of 
Hispanic individuals in an area has an insignificant (though negative) correlation with the 
filing rate, while a higher percentage of African American individuals in an area is 
correlated with significantly higher filing rates. 
The literature on the impact of BAPCPA is nascent and growing.  It was 
recognized early that the law’s impact would depend on how local judges, trustees, and 
attorneys filtered the new requirements for application in their judicial district (Jacoby, 
2005).  One impact of BAPCPA was that a “formidable array of new procedural 
requirements” raised the monetary costs of the bankruptcy process and made bankruptcy 
more time-consuming and burdensome to those who need it (White, 2006, p. 873).  The 
first empirical study with a random sample of post-BAPCPA bankruptcy nationwide 
concluded that the law reduced the number of bankruptcy filings by households of all 
income levels, failing to curb filings by higher income households without similarly 
restricting low income households (Lawless et al., 2008). 
A variety of perspectives prevail regarding bankruptcy policy.  Permissive 
bankruptcy rules give allowance to strategic individuals at the expense of creditors whom 
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courts selectively deprive of their legal right to seek fulfillment of loan contracts 
(Ausubel & Dawsey, 2001; Fay et al., 2002).  The court acts as intermediary in the power 
struggle between estranged debtors and creditors (Genicot, 2006).  Bankruptcy courts sort 
out which filers merit relief (Weston, 1977).  Profit-seeking lenders knowingly extend 
credit to individuals that possess incomplete information and bounded rationality; 
individuals need bankruptcy as a last resort for failures they cannot foresee (Ramsey, 
1997).  Without remedying underlying imbalances in spending and earning, ready 
bankruptcy relief condones lifelong habits of over-indebtedness that are costly for 
interest-paying households, particularly those that live on the verge of insolvency 
(Kilborn, 2005).  Bankruptcy is a much-needed aid for honest individuals overwhelmed 
by financial difficulty beyond their immediate control; bankruptcy allows deserving 
individuals a fresh start so they can begin contributing more fully to the well-being of 
their households and the economy (Sullivan et al., 1989).  Bankruptcy is a relatively 
neutral administrative task, merely certifying “the change in contractual obligations that 
insolvency necessitates” (Weston, 1977, p. 59).  Compared to default with bankruptcy 
relief, default outside of bankruptcy is more burdensome to individuals and less likely to 
have a remedial outcome, and bankruptcy policy determines the extent to which default 
and distress are addressed within bankruptcy system (Lawless et al., 2008). 
The supply of bankruptcy is perfectly price elastic.  Federal and state laws 
guarantee this option to anyone who qualifies for it, and the price of bankruptcy is not a 
function of the number of filings (Weston, 1977).  As for the price of bankruptcy, filing 
fees averaged $247 in our sample, as reported in Chapter 4.  The largest costs of 
bankruptcy are nonexempt assets liquidated in Chapter 7 cases (sample mean $524) and 
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payments required in Chapter 13 repayment plans (sample mean $13,139) with 9.2% of 
payments going to trustee fees—all of which vary based on the assets and income of each 
filer but do not depend on the quantity of bankruptcies.  Thus, prices are uniform for 
filing fees, but for the prices of repayment and liquidation, third-degree price 
discrimination reaches for each filer’s ability to pay based on extensive information 
submitted to the court.  Although the price of bankruptcy varies based on the income and 
assets of filers, a horizontal supply curve (see Figure 2.1) is appropriate because the price 
does not change as the quantity of filings changes. 
Bankruptcy law that implements price discrimination is favorable to creditors’ 
efforts to collect a higher percentage of debt before discharge (Holmes, 1989).  In the 
interest of burdened households and at the insistence of their attorneys, lawmakers and 
courts apply restraint on creditors’ eagerness to extract from debtors all money owed.  
Ninety bankruptcy districts—and individual judges and trustees within each district— 
communicate their own expectations for acceptable levels of repayment in Chapter 13, 
 
Figure 2.1:  Bankruptcy Supply and Demand with Reform 
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and judges determine differently who should receive discharge under Chapter 7 and 13 
(Lefgren & McIntyre, 2009).  Thus, average repayment rates and Chapter 13 filing rates 
differ greatly from one bankruptcy district to the next (Braucher, 1993).  The bankruptcy 
process is designed to tailor a relief plan to each filer that accounts for jurisdictional 
expectations.  Ultimately, the market for bankruptcy is not profit-seeking or competitive, 
although the court does finance much of its budget needs with filing and trustee fees.  
Predominantly, the supply of bankruptcy dictates a redistribution in the interest of 
fairness and practicality.  In the process, rewards and losses are distributed through 
connected markets. 
For example, bankruptcy policy creates demand in the market for legal services 
from bankruptcy attorneys—only 8% of our sample attempted bankruptcy pro se (see 
Chapter 4).  Although the court occasionally intervenes for exceptionally high attorney 
fees, pricing and the supply of legal services for bankruptcy are almost entirely left up to 
the market.11  BAPCPA policy transformed the market for debt counseling, which it 
made mandatory for all filers (Mecham, 2006).  Periodic legal reform enacts discrete 
reconfigurations of bankruptcy supply that may lower (1978) or raise (2005) the price of 
bankruptcy. 
Clearly, demand for bankruptcy results from strained household finances—
unsustainable combinations of spending, income, and borrowing—whether bankruptcy is 
approached deliberately or arrived at abruptly due to disruptive life events.  Bankruptcy 
                                                 
11 In a personal interview March 24, 2010, Kevin A. Anderson discussed the “no-look” attorney fee in Utah 
at the time for Chapter 13 cases, up to $2,750 for simple cases, as well as the court’s considerations in 
setting it.  Mr. Anderson is the Chapter 13 Trustee, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
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demand is a predictable percentage of households that default on loans (Ausubel & 
Dawsey, 2004).  Creditors drive indebted households to bankruptcy by pursuing invasive 
collection strategies and legal remedies, such as garnishment.  Attorneys create demand 
by advertising their profitable services (Braucher, 1993).  Demand is shaped by 
reluctance to file due to social norms and fear of diminished future access to credit (Fay 
et al., 2002; White, 1998B).  Common substitutes for bankruptcy include family networks 
(payments by relatives to individuals in financial distress), debt consolidation 
(professional help to renegotiate loans and reduce debt payments), and government 
assistance (unemployment insurance, Medicaid, and other forms of welfare) (Agarwal, 
2011; Sullivan et al., 1989). 
Bankruptcy acts as a tax on creditors.  A portion of the debts bankruptcy courts 
discharge could be collected by creditors absent court intervention.  In the market for 
credit, basic tax incidence analysis reveals that consumers are more likely to bear the 
burden of the implicit bankruptcy tax to the extent that demand is inelastic and supply is 
elastic (Weston, 1977).  We have explained bankruptcy’s highly elastic supply.  Demand 
for bankruptcy appears to be elastic based on the dramatic decline in filings after 
BAPCPA implementation raised the price of bankruptcy.  Nationwide filings in 2006 and 
2007 declined 61.6% compared to filings for 2004 and 2005, but the change in the price 
of bankruptcy with BAPCPA is more difficult to measure.  Our sample has a different 
group of debtors in the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods, and as noted, the price of 
bankruptcy is tailored to each household’s financial situation. 
Making bankruptcy law more permissive may not be in the interest of consumers 
themselves if the bankruptcy tax is passed on to consumers.  When their options besides 
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repayment improve (i.e., permissive bankruptcy), the tax incidence of bankruptcy 
imposes an increased burden in terms of the additional cost of credit assigned due to 
consumers’ lack of credibility in making a contract (Genicot, 2006), not to mention 
lingering effects in terms of labor market opportunities (Maroto, 2012).  By increasing 
the cost of credit, bankruptcy reduces aggregate borrowing and excludes consumers who 
would have borrowed at a lower price.  Credit history information allows creditors to 
require only households prone to bankruptcy to receive less favorable credit offers, thus 
reducing the redistributive effect from debtors who enter bankruptcy to debtors who pay 
(Weston, 1977). 
  





The choices of debtors before and during their bankruptcy cases provide a 
valuable context to measure the importance of incentives, risk tolerance, and moral 
hazard.  The government sets bankruptcy policy, and households decide how much to 
borrow.  Households pay their debts or default.  Those who default choose whether to 
enter bankruptcy.  Lawmakers and court officials determine loose (permissive, 
convenient, forgiving) or tight (strict, expensive, pro-creditor) bankruptcy policy.  
Bankruptcy acts as consumption insurance, where court fees and credit record damage12 
are the deductible, and the policy premium is the more expensive terms of credit resulting 
from the percentage of debt discharged by the court that creditors otherwise would have 
collected.  Besides loose bankruptcy policy, household borrowing is encouraged by an 
increase in expected future income, intertemporal consumption preferences characterized 
by a large discount rate, high levels of risk tolerance, more access to credit, and low 
interest rates.  The impact of income on borrowing is generally positive, but households 
below a threshold level of current income may borrow more out of desperation to meet 
basic needs. 
                                                 
12 Credit reports by the major bureaus retain a flag identifying those who have filed for bankruptcy in the 
past 10 years.  The Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the reporting of priori bankruptcies by credit bureaus to 
10 years. 
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After the debt level decision is made, households either fulfill loan obligations or 
default on their loans.  The probability of default is directly related to the amount of debt 
held by an individual.  The likelihood of default is inversely related to levels of current 
income and wealth, the latter of which may be subject to repossession or liquidation.  
Default may be caused by a disruptive life event, such as onset of an expensive illness, 
the birth of a son or daughter, a move, or a divorce.  Policy affects default to the extent 
that households anticipate filing bankruptcy default strategically, rather than considering 
default an acceptable option only if it is unavoidable. 
Finally, households that have defaulted on their loans choose whether or not to 
file for bankruptcy under either chapter of bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy policy affects this 
decision by defining how much debt is dischargeable and which assets debtors must 
surrender.  High levels of accumulated debt make filing for bankruptcy more likely, in 
particular the amount that is in collections.  Owning more assets would reduce the 
incentive to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7, where liquidation is possible.  Assets may 
be strategically shifted to forms eligible for bankruptcy exemptions, such as a primary 
residences, automobiles, and retirement funds. 
Incentives matter to the extent that financial outcomes are important to debtors’ 
decisions about bankruptcy.  Certainly, there are nonfinancial considerations, such as a 
personal sense of honor and integrity in keeping agreements with lenders and the social 
status associated with solvency at high levels of consumption.  Although constrained by 
character and culture, incentives are relevant as filing bankruptcy is largely a financial 
decision.  Filers receive financial benefit from bankruptcy discharge because debt 
obligations are removed.  On the other hand, the costs of filing for bankruptcy and the 
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loss of any property liquidated may create disincentives to file.  The actual impact of 
incentives packaged in bankruptcy policy depends on the knowledge consumers apply as 
they earn and spend, save and borrow, repay loans and default, with or without 
bankruptcy.  Heavily indebted individuals commonly inform themselves about their 
bankruptcy options via an attorney and otherwise soon before they approach their 
bankruptcy filing and long after making the decisions and experiencing the events that 
landed them in financial distress. 
Risk tolerance arises for households in bankruptcy because their borrowing 
choices reflect their willingness to accept risks associated with borrowing, such as 
income disruptions, unexpected expenditures, and changes in interest rates on some 
loans.  Debtors want to avoid negative consequences from default on loans, such as 
damaged credit scores, wage garnishment, and losses of collateral assets.  However, 
debtors have reasons for accepting such risk, such as the opportunity to fulfill goals such 
as obtaining more education or owning a home.  Furthermore, they may be borrowing 
during periods when their income is perceived to be temporarily low in order to smooth 
consumption relative their expected lifetime income.  The stronger the aversion to 
committing one’s future income in borrowing, the less likely that an individual will 
satisfy demand for present consumption beyond one’s current income and wealth. 
The presence of a bankruptcy option may reduce borrowing avoidance on the 
basis of debtors’ inherent risk aversion, if they believe that were they to borrow beyond 
their means, the court would help them sort it out without too much difficulty.  Strict 
bankruptcy policies that encourage risk aversion may raise debtor vigilance to avoid 
default on debt.  Alternatively, we must acknowledge the possibility that debtors may not 
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be weighing risks and considering outcomes because they are borrowing desperately to 
cover immediate, pressing needs.  Strict bankruptcy policies may also discourage people 
from moving ahead with business, education, and family goals that often require 
borrowing and generate lifelong individual gains and widespread societal benefits.  Risk 
tolerance also arises in bankrupt debtors’ choice to attempt a lengthy 3- to 5-year 
repayment plan under Chapter 13 in order to protect assets, while many of these debtors 
have the Chapter 7 option to seek the relatively prompt discharge of most debt while 
relinquishing certain nonexempt assets. 
Moral hazard yields insight into the bankruptcy process if debtors are less 
cautious in taking on credit or less determined to repay debt because they have 
bankruptcy as an insurance policy.  One implication of moral hazard in bankruptcy is that 
debt levels, and even the composition and value of assets, may be endogenous to the 
decision to file.  However, moral hazard is less likely in bankruptcy than for health, life, 
or fire insurance because of the repetitive nature of borrowing with smaller transactions 
and an eye towards maintaining access to credit in the future (Weston, 1977).  The brief 
game theory model in this study further explores moral hazard. 
Game Theory Model of Bankruptcy 
An imperfect information game theory model, Court v. Agent, illustrates 
incentives in bankruptcy (Rasmusen, 2007).  The agent incurs debt (d) to buy a risky 
asset (a) whose value may be high (ahigh > d) or low (alow < d).  If the agent acts 
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responsibly, the probability of ahigh is greater than if the agent acts irresponsibly.
13  The 
agent’s effort to be financially responsible has a cost (r). 
The agent facing alow is recompensed by the bankruptcy court, which forgives a 
portion (1-k) of debt and charges a fee (f ), which consists of trustee and filing fees set by 
the court and attorney fees approved by the court.  The fee is paid out of the agent’s 
assets.  While k is a percentage, we use a money value for f since filing fees are uniform 
and attorney fees vary little, although trustee fees are proportional to the amount of assets 
liquidated or debt repaid.  The portion (k) of debts not eliminated by bankruptcy account 
for major nondischargeable categories, such as secured debt, student loans, past-due 
taxes, alimony, and child support.14  Also contributing to k, the court may require 
repayment of a portion of otherwise dischargeable debt under a Chapter 7 liquidation or 
Chapter 13 repayment plan.  Figure 3.1 uses good and bad luck assigned by nature to 
represent the possibility of the asset value being high or low.  The diagram gives agent 
payoffs (πa) for each outcome. 
Suppose accepting debt of d = 100 results in either ahigh = 125 or alow = 75 based 
on the probabilities given in Table 3.1 for responsible and irresponsible debtors. 
The court can avoid moral hazard by satisfying the incentive compatibility 
constraint in Equations 1 and 2, which are based on the agent’s expected payoff from 
being responsible or irresponsible.  We use r = 10 for the cost of being responsible and 
initially assume the court forgives half of the agent’s debt:  k = 0.5 and kd = 50. 
                                                 
13 Separate modeling and analysis would be needed to consider normative and economic efficiency 
questions related to whether careful financial behavior is better than risk-tolerant choices.  The labels of 
responsible and irresponsible reflect prevailing views that financial failure entail an unnecessary and 
unproductive economic and social loss.  
14 See the Appendix for a discussion of bankruptcy law as it applies to which debts are dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of Court v. Agent Model with Payoffs 
Agent payoff, πa; asset value, a; percent not discharged of debt, k; 
debt, d; cost of being responsible, r; cost of bankruptcy, f 
Table 3.1:  Probabilities for Asset Values 
Based on Agent Responsibility 
 alow = 75 ahigh = 125 Total 
Responsible 0.1 0.9 1.0 
Irresponsible 0.5 0.5 1.0 
  
 
)()( bleirresponsiEeresponsiblE aa     
        ff  50755.01001255.01050751.0101001259.0
 
The court can induce responsibility by setting 25f . 
The policy makers who approved BAPCPA felt bankruptcy was too lenient to 
reliably induce debtor responsibility.  BAPCPA increased the costs of bankruptcy ( f ), 
including attorney and filing fees.  BAPCPA also raised the portion of debts not forgiven 
by requiring more debt repayment15, effectively raising k. 
                                                 
15 To this end, BAPCPA shortened the reprieve given for mortgage payments, classified even the unsecured 
portion of most auto loans as nondischargeable, and applied means testing to require of more households 
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In Equation 3, less generous debt forgiveness raises k from 0.5 to 0.55 and kd to 
55.  The result is that a lower minimum fee satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint 
introduced in Equation 1. 
        ff  55755.01001255.01055751.0101001259.0
 
The court can now induce responsibility by setting 20f .  A combination of 
less debt forgiveness and higher fees makes responsible behavior more attractive to the 
agent than either change separately could accomplish. 
Next, in Equation 4, we pursue a more general solution by not restricting k for the 
constraint given by Equation 1. 
       fkfk  100755.01001255.010100751.0101001259.0  
The result, which can be expressed as kf 10075 , is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Bankruptcy Policy and Debtor Responsibility 
f > 75 – 100k as an incentive compatible solution  
(4) 
(3) 





Online court records for the Utah district of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court include 
thorough documentation for all cases filed in Utah from January 1, 1984 to the present.16  
Basic information for 335,728 cases filed through December 2012 was readily 
downloadable.  As indicated in Table 4.1, the resulting summary dataset gives the 
number of filings, the frequency of Chapter 7 and 13 cases, filers’ home addresses, 
whether filings are joint or single, whether filers have assets, the duration of a case, the 
outcome (discharge, dismissal, or conversion), and the attorneys and trustees for each 
case. 
While preliminary case data are readily available from online court records, a 
second, original dataset requires manual data entry from documents produced by debtors 
or the court.  The data provide a detailed financial profile of households at the time of 
filing and disclose many nonfinancial variables.  This study introduces a detailed and 
unique dataset.  One comparable dataset existed for the Utah bankruptcy district prior to 
this study, based on 1997 cases (Lown & Rowe, 2003), and only a handful of such 
                                                 
16 This study was made possible by the generosity of the Utah district of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for providing exempt access to PACER data that otherwise would have cost thousands of dollars to 
obtain.  Since personal information with identifying information was accessed to construct the dataset for 
this study, we submitted a request for approval regarding human research to the Institutional Review Board 
of the University of Utah, identification number IRB_00061209.  In correspondence dated February 9, 
2013, the IRB stated its determination that this study is exempt from further review. 
   41 
  
Table 4.1:  Basic Information Readily Downloadable from Court Records 
Item Description 
Case number unique identifier 
Chapter bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 
Filer(s) name names of filer and joint filer 
Address complete mailing address 
SSN-4 last four digits of Social Security number 
Date filed filing date 
Date converted for cases converted between Chapters 7 and 13 
Date discharged for filings for which bankruptcy relief is granted 
Date dismissed for filings terminated without discharge 
Asset whether filers own any assets that may be liquidated 
Fee filing fee 
Judge last name of the judge assigned to the case 
Trustee last name of the court-appointed trustee 
Other parties creditors that file a special claim or motion 
datasets have been created for any bankruptcy district. 
Nearly all of the information indicated in Table 4.2 for the original data set is 
available in the initial filing submission, although it may be amended or challenged 
during the case.  For example, debtors provide updated information about income, tax 
returns, or attorney fees by submitting amendments to documents submitted in the initial 
filing; trustees may challenge the Chapter 13 repayment plan; creditors may revise a 
claim amount previously submitted; the court may grant specific creditors relief from the 
automatic stay to repossess property that secures their loan as collateral; debtors may 
agree to reaffirm a loan agreement, usually for secured debt, to exempt it from discharge; 
and judges may confirm the debtor’s repayment plan, perhaps with stipulations. 
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Table 4.2:  Original Dataset from Court Records, Details Manually Entered 
Item Description 
Marital Status married, single, widowed, divorced 
Dependents gender and ages of each child or adult dependent 
Employment occupation, employer name and address, duration of 
employment for debtor and spouse 
Tenure homeowner or renter 
Prior Addresses for the past 24 months with dates of occupancy 
Prior Bankruptcies date, case number, and location filed in the past 6-8 years 
Attorney name and address 
Filing Expenses payments already made for attorney, counseling, and filing 
fee within 12 months, total amount still owed to lawyer 
Assets: Real Property includes mortgage amount, market value for homes 
Assets: Personal Property classified in 35 categories, such as cash, home furnishings, 
savings accounts, clothing, and automobiles 
Exempt Property each exempt asset identified based on Utah exemption laws 
Debtor’s Intention in the 
Disposition of Assets 
for Chapter 7 cases only, whether debtor prefers to continue 
paying debt for each asset used as collateral or surrender it 
Liabilities: Secured Claims identifies each loan secured by collateral with creditor name 
and address, claim amount, value of collateral property 
Liabilities: Unsecured Claims itemized with creditor name and address, claim amount, etc. 
most creditors are identifiable as student loan agencies, 
collections companies, credit card companies, retail stores, 
medical providers, and payday/title lenders 
Other Liabilities: Priority 
Claims, Contracts & Leases 
includes priority claims, mainly taxes and child support, and 
active leases or contracts 
Income detailed by source (e.g., wages/salary, interest, alimony, 
social security, and pension) for debtor and spouse 
Prior Income total income, current year and 2 previous calendar years 
Expenditures regular expenses given by 28 categories, such as rent, house 
payment, food, laundry, recreation, and debt payments 
Debtor’s Proposed 
Repayment Plan 
For Chapter 13 cases only, amount intended for each secured 
and priority creditor, percent of unsecured debt to be paid, 
other details of 3-5 year repayment plan 
Court Confirmation of 
Chapter 13 Repayment Plan 
approves the plan proposed by filers and specifies any 
required changes 
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The original dataset enables us to create a profile of current bankruptcy filers to 
address many questions.  How has the composition of filers changed in terms of marital 
status, household size, age of children, stability of residence, occupation, duration of 
employment, previous bankruptcies, etc.?  Has there been a shift in the income of filers, 
the amount of debt, the type of debts owed, the value of assets, the type of assets, the 
proposed budgets, the total cost of filing, etc.?  Has behavior changed in terms of choice 
of bankruptcy chapter and repayment amounts in Chapter 13 bankruptcy?  We can 
compare our findings to those of Lown and Rowe (2003) for Utah filers in 1997 and 
Evans and Lown (2008) for Utah filers in 1999.  We can also reference Zhu (2008) for 
Delaware filers in 2003; Norberg (1999) for Mississippi filers in the 1990s; Sullivan et al. 
(1989) for filers in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas in 1981; and Himmelstein et al. 
(2009) for filers nationwide in 2007. 
The people in our data only include those in households that filed bankruptcy.  
Court documents give several pieces of information that illuminate factors leading to 
each decision to file bankruptcy.  For further investigation of the decision to file, data that 
includes both bankrupt and nonbankrupt households would be needed.  To that end, the 
Survey of Consumer Finances and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, for 
example, have been employed to great avail.  That avenue of research has been fruitful 
and is well-traveled.  Neither dataset gives state-specific results, and neither offers much 
information about subjects’ bankruptcies. 
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Unfortunately, we do not have data on the gender, race, age, or educational status 
of bankruptcy filer.17  We have no estimate from our sample for whether the bankruptcy 
process serves a percentage of female filers comparable to that found in the general 
population, although we discussed this issue previously18 (see Literature Review).  
Likewise, we lack the data to ascertain the impact of bankruptcy policy in general and 
BAPCPA in particular on people of a variety of educational backgrounds, races, and age 
categories.  These variables would be insightful for an array of descriptive statistics and 
regression analyses.  Finally, a sample with a longer post-BAPCPA time horizon would 
yield additional insights on the longer-term impact of reform. 
Sample Design and Comparison to the General Population  
The number of cases to be included in the sample is an important consideration 
due to the need for reliable results weighed against the feasibility of preparing the dataset 
set.  The sample includes cases filed within 24 months of when 2005 BAPCPA 
bankruptcy reform took effect.  Sample sizes from the bankruptcy literature for 
significant studies that used case-level court records range from 71 to 3,395.19  These 
studies have varying degrees of detail in terms of the number of data pieces collected for 
                                                 
17 Sullivan et al. (2000) employed a questionnaire to ascertain age, marital status, race, and educational 
background. 
18 In most cases, gender could be reliably judged based on individuals’ names and, if present, the spouse’s 
name.  Most court documents do not use gender-specific pronouns or make other references to a person’s 
sex.  Names may also suggest nationality or race, but even less dependably than for gender.  The age of an 
adult can scarcely be surmised, except perhaps by the age of dependents.  Occupation and employer 
information give clues as to the likely educational background of some filers.  So far, we have embarked on 
none of these interpretive ventures to better understand the people in our sample, although I believe 
Sullivan et al. (1989) did for gender. 
19 Sullivan et al. (1989) 1,529 cases from five states with excellent detail; Sullivan et al. (1994) 898 cases 
from three states, ancillary to their 1989 study; Domowitz and Sartain (1999) 827 cases from five states 
with moderate detail; Norberg (1999) 71 cases from Mississippi with limited detail; Norberg and Velkey 
(2006) 795 cases from five states; Eraslan et al. (2007) 1,084 Delaware cases with limited detail; Lown and 
Rowe (2003) 2,567 Utah cases with moderate detail; and Zhu (2011) 3,395 Delaware cases with less detail. 
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each case.  The number of cases included in our sample is heavily influenced by the 
resources available for data entry and preparation of the detailed, original dataset.  Our 
sample has more information per case than what was presented in the other studies, 
except for Sullivan et al. (1989). 
Maintaining a consistent sampling ratio for the periods before and after BAPCPA 
implementation would result in an unbalanced number of records for each period, since 
3.6 times more cases were filed in the prereform period compared to the postreform 
period (see Table 4.3).  To obtain balanced counts in the sample of Chapter 7 and 13 
cases and of prereform and postreform cases, a stratified sampling procedure with 200 
cases was selected, including 50 cases from each category mentioned.  Cases were 
included if a random number assigned to each case was among the 50 highest such values 
within each of the four categories. 
Statistics from 2005 compiled in Table 4.4 suggest the extent to which households 
in our sample are comparable to those in Utah and the U.S. generally, regardless of 
bankruptcy status, for the general time period of the study.  In 2005, median household 
income in Utah was 18.3% higher than the national average, but Utah’s large household 
size was an important factor in judging the adequacy of higher household incomes.  In 
Table 4.3:  Stratified Sample of Consumer Bankruptcy Cases 
[Number in sample] of [total cases filed] 
 
Filed Oct 17, 2003 to Oct 16, 2005 
before BAPCPA implementation 
Filed Oct 17, 2005 to Oct 16, 2007 
after BAPCPA implementation 
Chapter 7 50 of 34,643 50 of 6,294 
Chapter 13 50 of 11,445 50 of 4,002 
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Table 4.4:  Comparison of Bankruptcy Filers in Sample to the 
General Population, Filers, and Nonfilers, for Utah and the U.S. 
 Sample 





Median household income † $20,932 $54,813 $46,326 
Income per capita  $9,160 $20,814 $25,035 
Household size 2.70 3.12 2.57 
Marital status 
Married 
Single – never married 
Single – divorced, separated, 













Median age ‡ -- 28.5 36.4 
College graduates ‡ -- 19.2% 17.2% 
Median home value † $128,631 $167,200 $167,500 
Homeownership rate 38.4% 73.9% 68.9% 
Foreclosure rate 0.8% 1.1% 1.0% 
Credit card delinquency rate †† -- 6.3% 8.5% 
Self-employment rate 3.1% 5.6% 6.4% 
Poverty rate † 17.5% 10.2% 13.3% 
Unemployment rate † 5.3% 4.1% 5.1% 
Percent without health insurance ‡ -- 15.5% 14.6% 
Note:  Sample values given above are weighted estimates to correct for sample data having an equal 
number of Chapter 7 and 13 cases, rather than a preponderance of Chapter 7 filings.  Sample values 
for income and home value from 2003-2007 are adjusted for inflation to 2005 values for comparison 
to Utah and U.S. figures from those years. 
† Annual values for these four variables are provided in the next table within this chapter. 
‡ Bankruptcy records do not report filers’ age, educational attainment, or health insurance status. 
†† Credit card balances at least 90 days late as a percent of total credit card balances; see Figure 1.4 
for a graph showing more years than 2005; presumably, a high percentage of credit card balances in 
the sample could be classified as delinquent, but our data do not permit us to make an estimate for 
90+ day delinquency rates. 
Sources: Sample data; Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey; New York 
Federal Reserve Bank’s Consumer Credit Panel; U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community 
Survey, American FactFinder, Current Population Survey, and 2011 and 2012 Statistical Abstracts 
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fact, per capita income in Utah was 16.9% lower than U.S. per capita income of $25,034.  
Median household income of bankruptcy filers ($20,932) was merely 38.2% of the 
median income in Utah ($54,813), and the per capita income disparity was similar, with 
individuals in bankruptcy living with 44.0% of per capita income for the state as a whole.  
Compared to the rest of the country, more people in Utah were married and fewer were 
divorced, separated, or widowed.  Utah bankruptcy filers in our sample were much more 
likely to be divorced, separated, or widowed (25.8%) than the general population of Utah 
(13.5%).20  Related to household size and the presence of more children in Utah, the 
median age was much lower in Utah (28.5) than in the U.S. at large (36.4).  Utahns were 
more likely to be college-graduates than residents of other states.  Median home values in 
Utah and the U.S. for 2005 were almost identical, while the homes in our sample were 
much more affordable.  Homeownership among bankruptcy filers is very low (38.4%) 
compared to the national rate (68.9%) and Utah’s rate (73.9%).  Foreclosure is about as 
common among bankruptcy filers as for the general population, which presumably would 
not be the case if the automatic stay did not protect bankruptcy filers from foreclosure.21  
Self-employment, sometimes related to less financial stability, is less common in our 
sample (3.1%) than in Utah at large (5.6%) and less common in Utah than in the nation at 
large (6.4%).  Finally, compared to individuals nationwide, Utahns are less likely to have 
some form of medical insurance, but also less likely to be unemployed or in poverty.  
Although unemployment is hardly more common in bankruptcy than outside of 
                                                 
20 This is consistent with the findings from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the U.S. at large, 
in which 32.9% of individuals with a previous bankruptcy were divorced, separated, or widowed, compared 
to 21.2% for the general population (Maroto 2012). 
21 Foreclosures are suspended during bankruptcy.  The sample data for foreclosure reflect the 12 months 
previous to filing. 
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bankruptcy in Utah, poverty rates reached 17.5% in bankruptcy, compared to 10.2% for 
the state at large, consistent with the income disparity noted above. 
Of course, macroeconomic conditions were changing during the period of study, 
October 2003 to October 2007.  Household income was rising in Utah, though not as 
markedly as in the country at large.  As shown in Table 4.5, the Utah unemployment rate 
fell incrementally from 5.7% in 2003 to 2.6% in 2007.  Median home values rose 39.6% 
in Utah and 31.9% nationwide from 2003 to 2007, with home prices peaking in the first 
quarter of 2007 for the U.S. and in the fourth quarter of that year for Utah, declining 
slowly in both cases until the economic crisis intensified mid-2008.22  Based on general 
economic improvement during the period of study, absent policy changes, we would 
expect a somewhat lower bankruptcy rate. 
The financial situation of individuals in our bankruptcy sample changed over time 
relative to the general population in the state and country, as shown in Table 4.5.  We 
observe that nominal median household income for Utah bankruptcy filers in the sample 
rose an average of 16.3% per year from 2004 to 2007, growing much faster than the 2.2% 
average annual increase for the state at large.  Meanwhile, the poverty rate in the sample 
fell from above 20% in 2004 to 6.3% in 2007, while the Utah and nationwide rates were 
fairly stable.  An aggressive trend in rising median home values for the bankruptcy 
sample, which followed the state and national trends, was disrupted in 2006.  
Foreclosures were becoming less common in Utah at large during 2003-2007, while 
nationwide, foreclosures began to rise in 2006.  All three foreclosures in the sample  
  
                                                 
22 Median home prices are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American FactFinder.  Home prices’ maximums 
for the U.S. and Utah are based on the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s quarterly House Price Index. 
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Table 4.5:  Income, Home Value, Foreclosures, Unemployment, and Poverty 
Comparison of sample of Utah bankruptcy filers to the 
general population of Utah and the U.S., 2003-2007 
 2003 † 2004 2005 2006 2007 † 













Utah $49,275 $50,871 $54,813 $54,628 $53,529 
U.S. $43,318 $44,334 $46,326 $48,201 $50,233 
Home value, median      












Utah $156,657 $157,275 $167,200 $188,500 $218,700 
U.S. $147,275 $151,366 $167,500 $185,200 $194,300 
Foreclosure rate      
Homeowners in bk.  0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 3.2% 2.1% 
Utah 2.0% 1.6% 1.1% 0.7% 0.7% 
U.S. 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 2.0% 
Unemployment rate      
Bankruptcy sample ‡ 10.7% 5.2% 4.9% 0.0% 6.3% 
Utah 5.7% 5.1% 4.1% 2.9% 2.6% 
U.S. 6.0% 5.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.6% 
Poverty rate      
Bankruptcy sample ‡ 26.4% 17.1% 20.5% 9.7% 6.3% 
Utah 10.6% 10.9% 10.2% 10.6% 9.7% 
U.S. 12.7% 13.1% 13.3% 13.3% 13.0% 
Values from the bankruptcy sample are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample 
with the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for each year (see Table 4.3). 
† Sample data come from the last 2 months of 2003 and the first 10 months of 2007 in order to cover a 
24-month period before and after October 17, 2005 BAPCPA implementation. 
‡ Annual sample counts for the unemployment and poverty rates are the same as for median 
household income where n=196.  Four bankruptcy filers in the sample failed to report on their income, 
employment, and home value. 
Sources:  Sample data; Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey; U.S. Census 
Bureau’s American Community Survey, American FactFinder, and 2011 and 2012 Statistical Abstracts 
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happened to households filing from 2005 to 2007, too small a number to make inferences 
about the foreclosure rate for households in bankruptcy.  The unemployment rate in the 
sample decreased through 2006, much like the rates for the general population, but then 
unemployment jumped to 6.3% in 2007, perhaps due to the oncoming recession.  Overall, 
economic conditions are not clearly reflected in our bankruptcy sample for the variables 
in Table 4.5, particularly not for income and the poverty rate.  Clearly, during this period 
of bankruptcy reform, changes in bankruptcy demand cannot be understood without 
examining BAPCPA and its influence, but first, we will persevere somewhat more to 
understand economic conditions and demand for bankruptcy, particularly with regards to 
debt, which is not available in Table 4.5. 
Bankruptcy Filings and Case Outcomes 
Court records provide a wealth of information for bankruptcy filings during the 
period October 17, 2003 to October 16, 2007.  Table 4.6 addresses filing patterns.  
Including spouses and children, 607 individuals live in the 200 households included in 
our sample.  In terms of the number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases filed by debtors, 
our sample selects an equal number before and after BAPCPA, so we refer to actual 
numbers based on total filings.  During these 4 years, 2.7 Chapter 7 cases are filed for 
every Chapter 13 case filed.  It appears that, as intended, BAPCPA provisions led to more 
people choosing Chapter 13, with Chapter 13 cases as a percent of all consumer 
bankruptcy cases rising from 24.8% to 39.1%.  This 14.3% shift in the composition of 
Utah filings is consistent with a nationwide increase of a somewhat smaller magnitude 
(11.8%).  The percent of Chapter 13 cases filed by consumers in the U.S. rose from 
26.9% for 2004-2005 to 38.7% for 2006-2007 (USTP, 2010).  Of course, the percent of  
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Table 4.6:  Choice of Chapter and Joint Status for Bankruptcy Filings 
24 months before and after BAPCPA implementation 
 
All filings before BAPCPA after BAPCPA t value 
Number 
     Sample 











Joint filing status 
     Sample† 











  -0.24 
     4.57* 
Chapter 7 cases 
     Sample 













The period before BAPCPA is Oct 17, 2003 – Oct 16, 2005; after is Oct 17, 2005 – Oct 16, 2007. 
† Sample values for joint status are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample 
with the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah overall and for the pre- and 
post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3). 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 
0.05.  The critical value of the t statistic for a two-tailed situation with 100-200 degrees of 
freedom is 1.98; for over 1,000 degrees of freedom, it is 1.96. 
Chapter 7 cases filed decreased correspondingly after BAPCPA implementation for Utah 
and the U.S. 
The percentage of debtors filing jointly has apparently declined in the past few 
decades, based on a large sample of consumer bankruptcy filings from 1981, with 57% 
joint filings for five states which did not include Utah (Sullivan et al., 1989).  In 
Nebraska, 40.6% of cases filed during 1996 or 1997 were joint (Pollack, 1997).  That 
percentage was less than 40% for Utah during 2003-2007 (see Table 4.6), and joint 
filings became less common under BAPCPA (36.9%), compared to before the reform 
(39.3%).  For the entire period of the sample, 66.7% of the 108 cases filed by married 
couples were joint.  Joint filings are somewhat under-represented in the sample.  The 
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sample’s increase in the percentage of joint filings after BAPCPA implementation, 
though insignificant, is misleading, since the true percentage declines. 
Many changes in bankruptcy filings occurred following BAPCPA reform: a 
markedly reduced number of cases under both chapters of bankruptcy, an increased 
percentage of Chapter 13 filings, a lower success rate for Chapter 7 cases, an increased 
duration for Chapter 13 cases, and a potential increase in creditor payments under both 
chapters (see Table 4.7).  Total consumer bankruptcy filings in the 24-month period 
following BAPCPA implementation dropped 77.7% from the number for the 
corresponding pre-BAPCPA period.  The percentage of cases filed under Chapter 7 
decreased from 75.2% for the 2 years preceding BAPCPA implementation to 61.1% for 
the 2 years following.  A larger share of cases was dismissed and a smaller share 
discharged postreform, results that are highly significant for the sample as a whole and 
for Chapter 7 cases separately; they are present but not significant for Chapter 13 cases.  
Table 4.7 also makes it apparent that as debtors sought the most favorable chapter for 
which they could qualify, more cases were converted from one chapter to another after 
filing—a 40% increase in Chapter 7 to 13 conversions and a 60% increase in Chapter 13 
to 7 conversions.  In the 24 months after BAPCPA implementation, fewer bankruptcy 
cases were joint filings—whether for Chapter 7 cases (4.6% fewer) or for Chapter 13 
cases (2.8% fewer).  Couples were holding back from filing at all or were more likely to 
choose to file individually.  Individuals and couples who managed to file bankruptcy 
(under either chapter) were likely to obtain somewhat less favorable treatment because of 
BAPCPA. 
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Table 4.7:  Selected Characteristics of All Chapter 7 and 13 Bankruptcy Cases in Utah 
24 months before and after BAPCPA implementation, October 17, 2005 



























Joint filings, percent of 
filings 
36.7% 32.1% 7.05* 47.3% 44.5% 3.07* 
Assets, percent of filings 
with nonexempt assets 
14.9% 17.1% -4.61* 99.9% 99.4% 5.14* 
Case outcomes † 
  -  Discharged 
  -  Dismissed 
  -  Outcome not recorded 
  -  Converted to the other 
chapter after filing 
 
94.5% 
  4.2% 
  1.2% 
  4.0% 
  (7 to 13) 
 
89.2% 
  6.7% 
  3.7% 
  5.6% 










  0.1% 
  1.7% 




  2.1% 
  2.7% 







Duration, median days 
  -  Discharged cases only 



















The period before BAPCPA is October 17, 2003 to October 16, 2005; the period after BAPCPA implementation is 
October 17, 2005 to October 16, 2007.  Source: Analysis of basic court data for all consumer bankruptcy filings as 
of Jan 19, 2013, n=56,384 
† Outcomes of consumer bankruptcy cases are given as a percent of filings.  These values for discharged, 
dismissed, and outcome not recorded may not add up to 100.0% due to rounding.  Converted cases also belong to 
one of the other three categories. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
 
Besides the reform steering debtors away from bankruptcy, particularly Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, a significantly lower percentage of cases under that chapter were successful 
in obtaining discharge after BAPCPA (89.2%) compared to before BAPCPA (94.5%).  
More of the households filing under Chapter 7 had at least some assets the court could 
claim on behalf of creditors, with the percent rising from 14.9% to 17.1%.  As we find 
later in this chapter, creditors and the court stood to collect partial repayment from more 
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers after BAPCPA implementation, a group with higher income 
and a greater share of holders of nonexempt assets than the group that chose bankruptcy 
prior to BAPCPA.  As virtually all Chapter 13 cases reported assets, unchanged by 
BAPCPA, it appears households without assets increasingly did not file bankruptcy. 
Chapter 13 cases also became more challenging for debtors.  Their duration was 
23.5% longer after BAPCPA (621 days) compared to before (503 days), representing an 
increase in repayment plan length that was intended by bankruptcy reform.  Thus, the 
court extracted disposable income on behalf of creditors over a longer period of time 
from filers who continued making payments until discharge.  Dismissed filers also 
persisted longer in their Chapter 13 cases.  Referring to two common reasons for Chapter 
13 dismissal, filers since BAPCPA implementation may have continued longer without 
allowing some circumstance to prevent their compliance with expected regular payments; 
alternatively, many filers may have required longer to mend their mortgage arrears, at 
which point they no longer needed bankruptcy protection to prevent foreclosure. 
Household Characteristics 
Table 4.8 compares households before and after BAPCPA reform 
implementation.23  Sample data are weighted for these estimates to correct for the 
disproportionate presence of Chapter 13 cases based on our balanced sampling strategy.  
In general, aside from 3 out of the 16 variables, household characteristics in the sample 
did not change to a statistically significant extent from before to after BAPCPA  
                                                 
23 In Table 4.8, household size, marital, and employment information is missing for four or five debtors, 
depending on the specific variable, two before and two or three after, resulting in n < 200 for the complete 
sample and n < 100 for before and after BAPCPA.  Also, there are 108 spouses in the files, n=55 before 
and n=53 after reform.  For purposes of the “Mean years…” variable, the primary debtor in 166 households 
has employment. 
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     Mean dependents 1.24 1.14 1.68 -2.07* 
     Percent with any dependents 55.4% 54.5% 59.3% -0.67 
     Mean number in household 2.70 2.60 3.16 -2.21* 
- Chapter 7 2.45 2.36 2.94 -1.70 
- Chapter 13 3.38 3.34 3.50 -0.43 
Marital status     
     Single 25.5% 25.8% 24.0% 0.28 
     Married 48.7% 47.9% 52.3% -0.60 
     Divorced, separated, or widowed 25.8% 26.3% 23.7% 0.41 
          Divorced 20.9% 22.2% 14.7% 1.36 
          Separated 4.1% 3.5% 6.6% -0.96 
          Widowed 0.9% 0.5% 2.5% -1.16 
Employment status 
    
     Mean years at current job, if any 4.56 4.80 3.52 1.43 
     Employed:     
Debtor 84.6% 83.3% 90.5% -1.49 
- Self-employed 3.1% 3.0% 3.6% -0.23 
Spouse 41.3% 37.8% 55.5% -1.85 
     Unemployed     
Debtor 5.6% 6.1% 3.7% 0.76 
Spouse 4.0% 3.1% 7.8% -1.07 
     Retired or disabled     
Debtor 4.7% 5.0% 3.3% 0.62 
Spouse 9.7% 12.3% 0.0% 2.37* 
Residence † 
    
     Mean prior addresses, past 2 or 3 yrs  0.75 0.73 0.84  
     Percent with any prior address 42.7% 41.5% 47.8%  
     Percent homeowners 38.4% 38.9% 36.1% 0.41 
The sample dataset is weighted to make the stratified sample representative of the number of cases 
under each chapter before and after BAPCPA implementation, as indicated in Table 4.3. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† Before BAPCPA, previous addresses for the past 2 years were required.  Under BAPCPA, filers 
report on addresses for the past 3 years.  The t values for mean prior addresses and percent with any 
prior address have been omitted because comparisons using our data for these two variables would be 
invalid.  Finally, homeowners include households with mobile homes as a primary residence, though 
they may or may not own the land for their residences. 
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implementation.  We find that people filing under Chapter 13 tend to come from larger 
households, with an average of 3.4 people compared to 2.5 people per household filing 
under Chapter 7.  After BAPCPA implementation, the average household size of filers 
was higher, including more dependents, compared to that of filers before BAPCPA.   
Changes in marital status have been found to trigger bankruptcy (Fay et al., 2002; 
Zhu, 2008).  Unfortunately, bankruptcy documents do not reveal how recently a person 
became divorced, separated, or widowed.  In our sample, 25.8% of bankruptcy filers are 
divorced, separated, or widowed (Table 4.8), compared to only 13.5% of the Utah 
population over age 15 (American Community Survey [ACS], 2005).  The prevalence of 
divorce prior to bankruptcy fell from 22.2% before BAPCPA to 14.7% afterwards.  The 
overall change in the share of divorced, separated, or widowed filers post-BAPCPA was 
less pronounced, declining from 26.3% to 23.7%. 
Since BAPCPA, bankruptcy filers are less likely to be retired or unemployed, 
consistent with the decline in the average seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment 
rate from 4.7% to 2.9% during this time.24  As expected, the unemployment rate is 
significantly higher for bankruptcy filers than it is for the general population of the state 
during both periods.  The people in our sample are overwhelmingly employed.  They 
work in retail, government, construction, marketing, educational, healthcare, and real 
estate, among other sectors.  They include a senior account manager with 16 years of 
tenure, a maintenance worker at a car wash for 10 years, an airline ramp agent for 2 
years, and a drywall construction worker with 1 month on the job.  In spite of the 
                                                 
24 On the other hand, spouses of bankruptcy filers are somewhat more likely to be unemployed.  Source for 
Utah unemployment figures: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Seasonally 
adjusted monthly statewide unemployment for Utah, downloaded Nov 2011. 
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improvement in unemployment for the post-BAPCPA period, average job duration 
became considerably shorter. 
Filers may be less stable in their residence post-BAPCPA, reporting more prior 
addresses on average for the 2 or 3 years prior to their filing (see Table 4.8).  This 
observation is questionable, however, since the reporting requirement was lengthened 
from 2 years prereform to 3 years postreform.  The change in reporting could account for 
the entire difference in previous addresses, confounding our ability to report on the 
importance of relocation as a disruptive event contributing to bankruptcy. 
Repeat Bankruptcies and Other Debt-Collection Proceedings 
During the period 1984 to 2012, multiple filings exist for 39.4% of individuals in 
the sample.25  Nearly one-third (31.5%) of households in the sample have a repeat filing.  
Table 4.9 indicates that in the first 2 years under BAPCPA reform, the likelihood of 
bankruptcy filers having a previous filing was reduced, but the increase in repeat 
bankruptcy in the 5 years following is significant.26  We note that all 43 households that 
filed bankruptcy sometime after their cases within the sample also had filed bankruptcy 
prior to the sample case.  
Table 4.10 is fairly consistent with similar analyses of households in bankruptcy 
in Utah and other states.  Llewellyn and Lown (2005) reviewed 1997 filings for a time 
span of 21 years (1984-2004).  In that study, 33.9% of bankruptcy cases were not the 
debtors’ only filing, below the 41% of households in our sample that had repeat filings  
                                                 
25 The figure 39.4% comes from 200 filers along with 77 joint filers, of whom 78 filers and 31 joint filers 
have multiple bankruptcies. 
26 In the case of joint filings, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 present the total number of bankruptcies for the joint 
debtor with the most filings. 
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Table 4.9: Multiple Bankruptcy Filings Jan 1984 – Oct 2012 for 
Households in Sample before and after BAPCPA 
 Percent of Households  




Any filings 20 years 
before sample case 
29.9% 28.3%  0.80 
Any filings 5 years 
after sample case 
9.5% 21.7% -2.40* 
Any filings 
besides sample case 
30.4% 36.3% -0.88 
Values are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the actual number of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3). 
* Difference in means pre- and post-BAPCPA is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = 
mean after) is less than 0.05. 
 
Table 4.10: Total Bankruptcy Filings for Households in 
Sample, Jan 1984 – Oct 2012 
Number of Filings Before BAPCPA After BAPCPA 
1 59 59 
2 13 15 
3 13 9 
4 9 8 
5-9 6 9 
Total 100 100 
Since these values are unweighted frequencies based on an equal 
number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases before and after BAPCPA, 
the results do not match the weighted estimates given in Table 4.9. 
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(unweighted percentage).  As for the number of repeat filings, 17.6% of households from 
1997 filed exactly twice total, compared to 14.0% from the 2003-2007 sample, while 
16.2% from 1997 filed three or more times, compared to 27.0% in the later sample.  The 
somewhat higher number of repeat filers in our sample may be attributed to the difference 
in the time span covered. 
Table 4.11 describes bankruptcies and other debt-related court proceedings 
involving bankruptcy petitioners in the sample.  Since BAPCPA implementation, 
somewhat fewer people with previous bankruptcies in the past 8 years have attempted to 
obtain debt relief by filing again for bankruptcy, significantly fewer among Chapter 7 
filers.  The share with a previous bankruptcy within that time frame decreased from 24% 
to 16%.  A minimum waiting period of 2 to 8 years applies to Chapter 7 and 13 
bankruptcy filings, depending on the chapters of previous and current bankruptcy cases, 
as well as their outcomes (see Appendix).  For each situation, BAPCPA regulations 
lengthened or retained the waiting period.  Judging by the narrower differences before 
and after BAPCPA implementation for previous bankruptcies over a 20-year period—
from 30% to 28%—the extended waiting period policy does not reduce the number of 
repeat filers so much beyond 8 years. 
For all time periods shown before and after bankruptcy, repeat filings are much 
more likely for Chapter 13 filers than for Chapter 7 filers.  The 50% figure for Chapter 13 
cases with a previous bankruptcy in the past 8 years is much higher than the 30% 
observed for 1994 Chapter 13 filers in five states27 (Norberg & Velkey, 2006).  Repeat  
                                                 
27 The data from five states used by Norberg and Velkey (2006) allowed them to ascertain repeat filings for 
debtors during the period 1988 to 2002, 5 years shorter than the period covered by the figures in Table 
4.11. 
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    2.29* 
    0.97 
  -1.99* 
-0.39 
Any previous bankruptcies, past 20 years 29.6% 29.9% 28.3% 0.25 
     Chapter 7 18.8% 20.0% 12.0% 1.09 
     Chapter 13 58.4% 60.0% 54.0% 0.60 
Any previous bankruptcies, past 8 years 22.4% 23.9% 15.5%   1.49 
     Chapter 7 11.8% 14.0% 0.0%   2.82* 
     Chapter 13 50.4% 54.0% 40.0% 1.40 
Any future bankruptcies, 5 years after 11.7% 9.5% 21.7% -2.40* 
     Chapter 7 4.9% 4.0% 10.0% -1.17 
     Chapter 13 29.6% 26.0% 40.0% -1.49 
Court proceedings besides bankruptcy, past year    
     any proceeding 42.2% 39.5% 54.4% -2.13* 
     debt collection 31.6% 29.5% 40.8% -1.67 
     wage garnishment 9.3% 9.0% 10.8% -0.42 
     asset repossession, except home 14.5% 13.0% 21.2% -1.54 
     home foreclosure 0.9% 0.5% 1.7% -1.14 
Values are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the actual number of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3). 
† For Chapter 7 and 13 subcategories of the complete sample n=100. 
‡ Both before and after BAPCPA implementation, n=50 for Chapter 7 and 13 subcategories. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr < |t| is less than 0.05. 
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filing behavior varies over time and by state.  As for recent changes associated with 
bankruptcy reform, the percent with a previous bankruptcy in either the past 8 years or 
the past 20 years decreased with BAPCPA for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.  
However, the likelihood of future bankruptcy within 5 years increased for both chapters 
after BAPCPA implementation, from 10% to 22% overall, a statistically significant 
development.  In steering filers towards Chapter 13 and away from Chapter 7, bankruptcy 
courts under BAPCPA were more likely to serve households with previous and future 
bankruptcies.  The new limitations on bankruptcy relief under both chapters, however, 
may increase demand for multiple filings beyond the impact of the constrained chapter 
choice mechanism. 
Whereas a bankruptcy case is brought by a debtor, the other proceedings noted in 
Table 4.11 are brought by creditors and tend to induce indebted households to file for 
bankruptcy protection (Braucher, 1993).  The percent of bankruptcy petitioners that had 
been the subject of debt collection, wage garnishment, repossession, or foreclosure cases 
increased from 40% before BAPCPA to 54% afterwards.  Of these, debt collection 
proceedings and repossessions increased the most for our sample.  One possible 
explanation is that, with a decline in consumer bankruptcy cases to 28% of pre-BAPCPA 
levels (see Figure 1.8), a more desperate group of debtors attempted to find relief under 
the stricter law, many of them prodded to file by creditors’ court actions, rather than 
choosing proactively to use bankruptcy to re-order their finances before being prompted 
by creditors to do so.  Eraslan, Li, and Sarte (2007) find that 53% of its much larger 
sample from 2001-2002 had at least one proceeding pending upon filing for bankruptcy 
in Delaware. 
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Bankruptcy may remove a dischargeable debt for which wages had been 
garnished, and during the bankruptcy case, the automatic stay protects debtors from 
standing garnishment judgments.  Furthermore, the monthly payment required in a 
Chapter 13 case may be less than the amount garnished.  In Utah, up to 25% of 
disposable income may be withheld by employers or assistance programs, such as the 
Social Security Administration.28  Once a debtor has sustained the credit injury that 
accompanies garnishment, the deterrent to bankruptcy of protecting one’s credit score 
weakens, and bankruptcy relief appears less repulsive and more urgent. 
Income 
Households in bankruptcy generally have one income earner.  In 52.7% of the 74 
households filing jointly, one adult joint filer receives no income.29  In an analogous 
measure, 56.5% of the 108 households with a married couple (including many who chose 
not to file jointly) report one spouse as having receiving no income. 
As shown in Table 4.12, the income of Chapter 7 filers rose significantly with 
BAPCPA implementation.  Clearly, the intent of the reform was to prevent households 
with high income from filing under Chapter 7.  However, similar to its outcome 
nationwide (Lawless et al., 2008), BAPCPA in Utah has not reduced bankruptcy use by 
higher level households alone, but has reduced its use by households across income 
groups.  A decrease in income post-BAPCPA would have suggested the prevalence of  
                                                 
28 Utah Code Title 70C Chapter 7 § 103 states that the “maximum part of… disposable earnings… which is 
subjected to garnishment… may not exceed the lesser of: (a) 25% of his disposable earnings for that pay 
period: or (b) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that pay period exceed 30 hours per week 
multiplied by the federal minimum hourly wage…” 
29 Data for spousal income in joint households is from the last Schedule I amendment submitted by filers, if 
any, whereas the income data in Table 4.12 is from the original Schedule I, which documents employment 
and income. 
   63 
  
Table 4.12:  Real Monthly Household Income 

























Means are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the 
actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-
BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  Standard deviation is not weighted.  Income 
was not reported by four households in Chapter 13. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean 
after) < 0.05. 
 
bankruptcy filers with above-median income before BAPCPA.  We found in Table 4.5 
that median income for households in the bankruptcy sample rose far more than median 
income for the general population of Utah and the U.S. (in absolute and percentage 
terms). 
Sullivan et al. (1989) emphasized the prevalence of recent income interruption as 
a characteristic of debtors in bankruptcy in 1981.  Sullivan et al. (2000) reported that 
income disruption from job loss happened in 52% of households’ bankruptcies in 1991.  
That figure is based on any unemployment in the past 2 years lasting at least 2 weeks, 
although short-term unemployment does not necessarily reflect a significant change in 
income (White, 2007).  Fay et al. (2002) find adverse events, including unemployment, 
are not significant predictors of filing for bankruptcy during 1984-1995.  A cursory 
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review of filing rate and the incidence of divorce, unemployment, and medical spending 
likewise do not suggest an important relationship (White, 2007). 
To evaluate the income disruption hypothesis for our sample, a t test is used to 
compare income 1 and 2 years previous to filing to annual income at the time of filing.  
We find a statistically significant decline in income compared to the 12 months before 
filing (difference in means = -$3,455 or -9.8%, t value = 3.12, p = 0.0021).  The result 
persists when we compare income at filing to average annual income for the 24 months 
preceding bankruptcy (difference in means = -$3,194 or -9.1%, t value = 2.27, p = 
0.0242). 
Assets 
There appear to be some changes in the value of assets owned for debtors that file 
for bankruptcy after BAPCPA.  First, we view all real estate and personal assets.  The 
main reason assets have declined under BAPCPA for Chapter 13 filers in the sample (see 
Table 4.13) is that fewer Chapter 13 filers are home owners compared to before 
Table 4.13:  Total Real Assets 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 













Asset values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars based on the BLS 
Consumer Price Index.  Means are weighted estimates that align data 
from a stratified sample with the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  
Standard deviation is not weighted. 
† The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
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BAPCPA, although the value of automobiles has also decreased somewhat for Chapter 
13 filers. 
Real property is the largest component of total real and personal property.  As 
indicated in Table 4.14, since BAPCPA implementation, a smaller percent of filers were 
home owners, with the home ownership rate decreasing slightly for Chapter 7 filers and 
markedly, from 72.9% to 54.2%, for Chapter 13 filers (p-value = 0.057).  Households in 
with any real property, including mobile homes, that filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy after 
BAPCPA implementation are better off in terms of real property value (14.4% increase) 
compared to households that filed before BAPCPA.  On the other hand, home equity for  
Table 4.14:  Real Property  
by Chapter Before and After BAPCPA Implementation 








t value ‡ 








Value of real property, 
















Home equity, real property 
minus mortgage(s), for filers 
















Property values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars based on the BLS Consumer Price Index.  
Means are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the actual number of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  
Standard deviation is not weighted. 
† Summary statistics for these variables represent households with any real property.  The number of 
cases for each chapter and time period is 50, with missing data from households as follows: Chapter 7 
before (0), Chapter 13 before (2), Chapter 7 after (0), and Chapter 13 after (2). 
‡ The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
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those with any property appears to have decreased with BAPCPA for both chapters, with 
a larger absolute and percent change for Chapter 7 filers.  Chapter 13 filers have 
considerably more home equity to protect during bankruptcy than Chapter 7 filers.  Under 
Chapter 13, they can avoid liquidation meant to recover nonexempt equity, which is part 
of the Chapter 7 process.  The majority of households in the sample are well within the 
home exemption limits of $20,000 per individual and $40,000 per couple under either 
chapter before and after BAPCPA implementation.  Very few have home equity available 
for distribution to creditors. 
Motor vehicles are the second largest category of property.  Median values of all 
motor vehicles owned by debtors in our sample declined somewhat (7.7%) under Chapter 
7 and considerably (30.2%) under Chapter 13, as indicated in Table 4.15.  The standard 
deviation of this variable decreased considerably since BAPCPA in Chapter 13 cases. 
Table 4.15:  Real Value of Automobiles 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 













Data values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars based on the BLS 
Consumer Price Index.  Means are weighted estimates that align data 
from a stratified sample with the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  
Standard deviation is not weighted. 
† The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Debt 
Two hundred households list a total of 4,383 individual debts in the court records 
amounting to $21.7 million.  Households have an average of 21.9 debts worth $4,958 
each.  Aside from mortgages, these obligations average $2,433 each.  Since BAPCPA 
implementation, the median debt level rose 47.9% for Chapter 7 cases and fell 9.1% for 
Chapter 13 cases, while means for each chapter changed by 13.4% and -5.7%, 
respectively.  We can conjecture as to the logic of those changes:  people wait until they 
are in more debt to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy after BAPCPA made the bankruptcy 
process more stringent; on the other hand, because of the means test pushing more 
bankruptcy filers towards Chapter 13, even people who have neither high levels of assets 
to protect nor high levels of associated secured debts to manage may still file under 
Chapter 13, including some who before BAPCPA would have preferred Chapter 7.  The 
larger movement in medians than means suggests some exceptionally high values post-
BAPCPA. 
Debt-to-income ratios are one indication of the overall financial standing of 
debtors in bankruptcy.  The unsecured debt category in Table 4.16 consists of both 
priority claims (e.g., taxes) and nonpriority claims (e.g., credit card debt) that are not 
secured by collateral.  While the secured debt-to-income ratio is much higher for Chapter 
13 filers, the unsecured debt-to-income ratio is much higher for Chapter 7 filers.  In 
considering the debt burden these two ratios represent, unsecured debt, though smaller in 
magnitude, generally has a shorter repayment term and higher interest rates compared to 
secured debt.  Secured debt burdens of bankruptcy filers are much smaller after BAPCPA 
than before.  In contrast, unsecured debt burdens are somewhat higher.  The overall debt 
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t value ‡ 
Total Debt    
     Chapter 7 233.0% 281.0% 1.35 
     Chapter 13 361.2% 295.7% 1.34 
Secured debt    
     Chapter 7 44.4% 28.9% 0.89 
     Chapter 13 262.1% 177.6% 1.74 
Unsecured debt    
     Chapter 7 166.0% 125.2% 0.74 
     Chapter 13 82.0% 85.5% -0.62 
† Due to missing values, for all three types of debt before BAPCPA implementation 
n=47 for Chapter 7 cases and n=48 for Chapter 13 cases; after BAPCPA 
implementation n=49 for Chapter 7 cases and n= 48 for Chapter 13 cases. 
‡ The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
burden has increased at the median only under Chapter 13.  Mean total debt under 
Chapter 7, however, fell from 402.8% to 328.6% of income. 
Court records make use of three broad debt categories—secured, priority 
unsecured, and nonpriority unsecured—whose values for our sample are presented in 
Table 4.17.  Secured debt, 61.3% of total debt, includes all loans that have collateral, 
such as homes or cars.  Debt classified as priority in bankruptcy includes overdue taxes, 
child support, alimony, and other debts, amounting to only 1.9% of total debt, all 
ineligible for forgiveness in bankruptcy.  Unsecured debts without priority status, 
amounting to 36.8% of the total, are generally dischargeable.  This includes credit cards 
and unpaid bills. 
The rather high standard deviation values in each debt category indicate the broad 
variety in characteristics of individual filers, as well as the presence of a handful of  
   69 
  
Table 4.17:  Real Secured, Priority and Other Household Debt 
Mean (Standard deviation) 


































































Debt values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars based on the BLS Consumer Price 
Index.  Means are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the actual 
number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods 
(see Table 4.3).  Standard deviation is not weighted. 
† The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
households with very high levels of debt in a certain category.  The distributions of these 
debt variables are skewed right. 
Secured debt consists almost entirely of mortgages (85.9% of total secured debt in 
the sample) and automobile loans (12.5% of the total), with only 1.6% remaining as other 
secured debt.  The percentage with some type of secured debt fell after BAPCPA 
implementation from 74.0% to 67.3% for Chapter 7 cases and from 89.6% to 83.3% for 
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Chapter 13 cases.  Secured debt levels on average are much higher for Chapter 13 cases 
than they are for Chapter 7 cases, as expected, since many debtors choose Chapter 13 
because they have assets they want to protect from repossession while catching up on 
loan arrears.  BAPCPA implementation is associated with a noteworthy decline in the 
amount of secured debt by Chapter 13 filers.  Given a 20.8% decrease in the mean and a 
48.4% decrease in the median for our sample, secured debt means would have been much 
lower post-BAPCPA but for some very high values after BAPCPA implementation.  For 
Chapter 7 filers, median secured debt decreased 21.4%, while its mean actually rose 
significantly.  With very high standard deviations, we cannot identify statistically 
significant shifts in secured debt post-BAPCPA. 
Priority debts in our sample consist mainly of tax claims (74.6% of total) and 
domestic support payment claims (16.0%), with 9.4% of the claims falling outside the 
two subcategories.  One fourth of all bankruptcy filers in our sample report any priority 
debts.  After BAPCPA implementation, the percentage of filers with any priority debt 
decreased from 18% to 12% for Chapter 7 and from 38% to 35% for Chapter 13.  For 
those with priority debt, the median and mean amounts rose dramatically for Chapter 7 
cases in the sample.  Households with priority claims are more likely to file under 
Chapter 13 than Chapter 7, but that propensity is somewhat weaker under BAPCPA. 
The value of nonpriority, unsecured debts—those not secured by collateral and 
without priority status—increased dramatically since BAPCPA for Chapter 13 filers and 
only somewhat for Chapter 7 filers.  All but one household that filed the required 
schedules reported at least some nonpriority, unsecured debt.  Nonpriority, unsecured 
claims can be classified as follows: credit cards, collections, medical bills, payday loans, 
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student loans, and other.  Porter (2012) reported that 25% of 2007 debtors sampled had 
student loans.  Domowitz and Sartain (1999) found that medical and credit card debt in 
particular lead to bankruptcy filings and that high levels of medical debt are associated 
with choosing Chapter 7.  Payday loans include outlets for advance check cashing, title 
loans, and pawn shop loans.  The relative importance of these categories is given in Table 
4.18.  The collections subcategory is not mutually exclusive of the others, in that a credit 
card balance or medical bill, for example, may be in collections and thus count under two 
categories.  We see that medical debt is the most common and the largest debt outside of 
secured and priority debts like mortgages and child support obligations, followed closely 
by credit card debt.  In Chapter 5, we find associations between these debt categories and 
bankruptcy filers’ chapter and repeat filing status.  Though the share of debt that comes 
from student and payday loans may be smaller categories here, they are significant in that 
analysis. 
Table 4.18: Nonpriority, Unsecured Debt Subcategories 
 Percent reporting 
any of debt type, 
n=196 † 
Percent of nonpriority 
unsecured debt, 
aggregate 
Real median debt 
for cases with 
any of type 
Medical 87.9% 39.7% $9,464 
Credit card 87.1% 40.4% $8,740 
Collections ‡ 61.2% 15.8% $4,717 
Student loans 20.0% 6.3% $8,794 
Payday 10.7% 1.1% $1,234 
Other 62.0% 12.3% $2,258 
† In four cases, households failed to itemize their nonpriority, unsecured claims. 
‡ Claims from any other debt category can also be in collections.  Debt types besides collections are 
mutually exclusive. 
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Table 4.19 explores changes in the composition of nonpriority, unsecured debts 
since BAPCPA implementation.  The share of medical debt presented in bankruptcy rose 
from 37.7% before BAPCPA to 48.8% after reform, while the share of credit card debt 
declined from 42.7% to 30.1%.  The rise in debt to pawn shops and payday lenders to 
2.4% is also significant.  An increase in the percentage of nonpriority, unsecured debt in 
collections is significant at the 0.10 level with a p-value of 0.069.  Meanwhile, student 
loans and the “other” category remained about the same across policy regimes. 
Expenditures 
Debtors are required to report their monthly spending in several categories.  As 
indicated in Table 4.20, inflation-adjusted expenses are significantly higher for Chapter 7 
cases after BAPCPA compared to before, while expenses in Chapter 13 cases decreased 
slightly.  Changes in expenses mirror changes in income by chapter before and after 
BAPCPA implementation.  In fact, expenses as a percent of income at the median only 
rose from 100.1% to 102.3% for Chapter 7 filers and from 87.0% to 88.1% for Chapter 
Table 4.19: BAPCPA and Nonpriority, Unsecured Debt Composition 
Debt types as a percentage of total nonpriority, unsecured debt, means 






Medical 37.7% 49.0%   -2.50* 
Credit card 42.7% 30.1%    2.59* 
Collections 14.8% 20.6% -1.70 
Student loans   6.5%   5.6%  0.40 
Payday   0.1%   2.4%   -2.04* 
Other 12.2% 13.0% -0.26 
* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) < 0.05. 
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Table 4.20:  Real Monthly Expenditures 























* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
13 filers.  As expected, practically all Chapter 13 filers have some disposable income 
with which to fund the required repayment plan under that chapter.  On the other hand, 
most Chapter 7 filers report having no disposable income.  Predictably, total expenses 
tend to vary directly with household size (see Table 4.21).  Standard deviations remain 
high for these results, even when cases under each chapter are analyzed separately. 
Table 4.21:  Real Expenditures by Household Size 
Household Size n Mean Standard Deviation 
1 46 $1,365 $514 
2 50 $2,532 $1,058 
3 36 $2,191 $971 
4 26 $2,705 $742 
5 18 $3,683 $1,336 
6 12 $3,672 $753 
7 9 $3,816 $1,099 
8 3 $4,566 $1,546 
Means are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with 
the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and 
post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  Standard deviation is not weighted. 
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Table 4.22 shows the relative importance of subcategories of expenses in terms of 
aggregate spending amounts as a percent of the $494,842 in aggregate expenditures (real 
2005 dollars) reported for sample households.  These expenses, which were originally 
given in 28 categories, are grouped for simplicity into the nine categories shown below.  
Expenditure information gives insight into the lifestyle of debtors. 
The costs of filing for bankruptcy rose since BAPCPA implementation, as 
documented in Table 4.23.  Filers were required to pay for mandatory debt counseling 
post-BAPCPA at an average expense of $50.  As expected, considering the increased 
complexity of the bankruptcy process postreform, the number of debtors filing 
bankruptcy without an attorney decreased after BAPCPA implementation.  The average 
inflation-adjusted fees charged by attorneys increased dramatically, by $326 or 55.8% for  
Table 4.22:  Expenditures by Subcategory 
Aggregate subcategory spending as a 
percent of aggregate total spending 
House payment or rent 29.2% 
Transportation expenses 17.5% 
Food 17.4% 
Utilities, home maintenance, and 
homeowner/renter insurance 11.7% 
Medical expenses 6.8% 
Clothing and laundry 4.4% 
Recreation 2.4% 
Charitable contributions 2.3% 
Other 8.3% 
Values are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified 
sample with the actual number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases 
in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3). 
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     Attorney fee, mean † $1,059 $938 $1,626 -5.27* 
- Chapter 7 $632 $584 $910 -5.27* 
- Chapter13 $2,228 $2,053 $2,728 -7.72* 
     % pro se, without attorney 8.1% 9.0% 4.0% 1.44 
Court fees 
    
     Total court fees, mean $230 $217 $286 -14.41* 
- Chapter 7 $232 $220 $300 -11.02* 
- Chapter 13 $223 $208 $264 -13.17* 
Debt counseling ‡ 
    
     Cost, mean of nonzero values $50 $43 $51     -0.75 
     % receiving counseling, past yr. 15.3% 5.0% 81.7% -20.36* 
All values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars based on the BLS Consumer Price Index. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) < 0.05. 
‡ Missing values for the attorney fee variable are as follows: Chapter 7 before (1), Chapter 13 
before (2), Chapter 7 after (6), and Chapter 13 after (2). 
† Missing values for the cost of debt counseling are as follows, reflecting debtors who did not 
submit a completed Statement of Financial Affairs: Chapter 13 before (2) and after (2). 
 
Chapter 7 cases and by $675 or 32.9% for Chapter 13 cases.  Chapter 13 attorney fees are 
almost entirely taken from the regular debt payments required over a 3- to 5-year period, 
with a small retainer if any.  In contrast, Chapter 7 fees are almost always paid up front.  
Since BAPCPA implementation, mean real court fees rose by $69 or 31.8%. 
Spending on charitable contributions as a percent of income is higher in Utah than 
in most other states.30  This could be seen as a source of financial strain contributing to 
                                                 
30 For example, this observation is documented in a study by the Utah Foundation (2004), which reports 
that Utahns’ charitable contributions, as reported on their tax returns, rank the state second out of 50 for 
giving as a percent of income. 
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Utah’s high bankruptcy filing rates historically.  Another view is that charitable 
contributions provide leeway in a debtor’s budget, which reduces disposable income 
available for Chapter 13 repayments and makes plan completion more likely (Klee, 
2001).  Of households in our sample, 33.2% report charitable contributions.  Chapter 7 
filers were more likely to report charitable contributions in their budgets, particularly 
before BAPCPA implementation.  The median giving amount is 7.1% of income.31  Since 
BAPCPA implementation, for whatever reason, the number of debtors making any 
contributions has fallen, while the total amount given has risen somewhat, as shown in 
Table 4.24. 











Percent of households with any 33.2% 35.6% 22.5% 2.03* 
   - Chapter 7 









Percent of income, median of 
nonzero contributions  
7.1% 7.0% 8.0% -0.45 
Values are weighted estimates that align data from a stratified sample with the actual number of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases in Utah for the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods (see Table 4.3).  
There are fewer than 200 cases total, and fewer than 100 per sub-period, because a few bankruptcy 
filers did not report their expenditures. 
* Difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) < 0.05. 
 
                                                 
31 There is some incentive to report high values for charitable contributions, up to 15% of income, because 
a provision in bankruptcy code, present since before BAPCPA, allows up to that amount in charitable 
contributions in debtor-reported expenditures.  Reporting higher amounts of charitable contributions 
reduces disposable income.  However, there are also legal imperatives for accuracy on court documents, as 
debtors avoid perjury and attorneys protect their reputations. 
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Chapter 13 Plans 
Chapter 13 plans involve a lengthy repayment period.  The office of the Chapter 
13 trustee receives filers’ payments and distributes them to creditors after withholding the 
stipulated trustee and attorney fees.32  As each case closes, the trustee files a final report 
of these activities.  As shown in Table 4.25, based on those reports, money collected was 
distributed as follows: secured debt (33.2%), unsecured debt (23.8%), attorneys (32.7%), 
and trustee (10.0%).  Median attorney payments via the plan increased after BAPCPA 
reform from $1,709 to $2,287.  Trustee fees remained steady at 8.1% of total receipts 
from filers. 
Median payments declined from $10,272 before BAPCPA to $8,740 postreform.  
One evident reason for this is that Chapter 13 plans were much less likely to be 
completed under BAPCPA: fewer payments were made by filers whose cases were 
converted or dismissed than for filers who continued through to discharge.  In particular, 
confirmed Chapter 13 repayment plans were about half as likely to be completed after 
BAPCPA reform compared to before.  Although payment amounts declined, payments as 
a percent of total debt obligations increased somewhat with BAPCPA implementation, 
although the change in means is not statistically significant.  Eraslan et al. (2007), by 
simulating BAPCPA collection outcomes based on Delaware cases from 2001 and 2002, 
found repayment was likely to increase in Chapter 13 under BAPCPA.  While the dollar 
amount of Chapter 13 repayments decreased in Utah, consistent with Eraslan et al., the 
driving factor was the changing profile of debtors attempting bankruptcy under  
                                                 
32 Trustee fees are collected on a sliding scale with a lower percentage of receipts withheld as trustee fees 
for amounts over defined threshold levels.  Apparently, the distribution of payment amounts per case did 
not change sufficiently with BAPCPA to alter the trustee fee percentage. 
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Table 4.25:  Chapter 13 Plan Payments by Bankruptcy Filers 
Payments before Discharge, Conversion, or Dismissal 









Chapter 13 cases in sample† 
Repayment plans confirmed 











Total payment by filers‡ 
Median 
Mean 
Percent of total debt, median 
Percent of total debt, mean 
























Payment for secured debt‡ 
Median 
Mean 
Percent of secured debt, median 
Percent of secured debt, mean 
Percent of total payment, median 
Percent of total payment, mean 

































Payment for unsecured debt‡ 
Median 
Mean 
Percent of unsecured debt, median 
Percent of unsecured debt, mean 
Percent of total payment, median 
Percent of total payment, mean 
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Attorney fee paid through plan‡ 
Median 
Mean 
Percent of total payment, median 
























Percent of total payment, median 





















The t values evaluate the difference in means pre- and post-BAPCPA.  The critical value is 1.98 for 
significance at the 0.05 level. 
† This table includes cases begun under Chapter 13 and those converted from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13. 
‡ These variables are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars using the BLS consumer price index. 
 
  
   80 
  
BAPCPA, namely less secured debt (see Table 4.16), for which the Delaware simulation 
did not account. 
BAPCPA provisions were seen as a way to raise the priority in repayment of 
secured creditors over unsecured creditors (Jacoby, 2006; Wedoff, 2005).  However, our 
sample gives no indication of an increase in the percent of plan payments allocated to 
secured creditors.  If anything, the percentage of debt payments decreased for secured 
debt and increased for unsecured debt, though these changes are not conclusive.  The 
ratio of secured debt to unsecured debt paid through Chapter 13 plans in our sample 
decreased post-BAPCPA from 1.2 to 1.0.  However, it should be noted that the debt 
portfolios of Chapter 13 filers in our sample include a greater share of unsecured debt and 
a smaller share of secured debt post-BAPCPA (see Table 4.16). 
Table 4.26 presents information from the Chapter 13 plans filed by debtors.  We 
focus on the percent of nonpriority unsecured debt to be repaid, because this is the most 
discretionary component of debt repayment, based on disposable income and, in some 
cases post-BAPCPA, based on an additional review.  Secured debt amounts, including 
arrears, and priority unsecured loans are not reduced or forgiven in bankruptcy.   
Table 4.26: Payment Proposed in Chapter 13 Plans 










t value † 
Percent of nonpriority unsecured 
claims to be repaid, mean 
24.4% 26.9% 21.4% 0.92 
† The critical value is 1.99 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
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BAPCPA includes provisions that strengthen the ability of secured creditors and some 
priority unsecured creditors to collect their dues, often at the expense of unsecured 
nonpriority creditors.  As expected, we see that lower repayment percentages are 
proposed in cases that specify a percent of nonpriority unsecured claims to be repaid.  
About half of all repayment plans are completed, resulting in discharge for those 
individuals and couples in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  Cases are dismissed for filers who do 
not timely submit required paperwork or who do not make monthly payments for a 3- or 
5-year period, as stipulated by a Chapter 13 partial repayment plan.  Historically, Chapter 
13 dismissal rates have been high.  For example, Norberg and Compo (2007) found that 
dismissal rates varied widely by district, from 53% to 80%, for 795 Chapter 13 cases 
filed in seven judicial districts outside of Utah in 1994.  Of the 94 cases in our sample 
that ended up in Chapter 13 (either originally filed under Chapter 13 or converted from 
Chapter 7), fully 51 were dismissed.  As shown in Table 4.27, dismissal is primarily an 
issue for Chapter 13 cases, of which more than half were dismissed.  A higher percentage 








t value ‡ 
Chapter 7 † 4 
(3.8% of 106) 
2 
(3.9% of 51) 
2 
(3.6% of 55) 
0.08 
(0.940) 
Chapter 13 † 51 
(53.7% of 94) 
22 
(44.9% of 49) 
29 




(53.7% of 94) 
24 
(24.0% of 100) 
31 
(31.0% of 100) 
-1.11 
(0.270) 
† This table’s bankruptcy chapter designation reflects the chapter filers ended up choosing for cases 
that were converted from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 (three cases) or from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 (10 
cases) before dismissal or discharge. 
‡ The critical value is 1.98 for significance at the 0.05 level. 
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of cases was dismissed after BAPCPA implementation (64.4%) compared to before 
(44.9%).  According to a t test at the 0.05 confidence level, the increase in dismissals is 
not quite significant for Chapter 13 cases in the sample. 
Dismissals in the post-BAPCPA period were not concentrated immediately after 
the reform, contrary to the expectation that initially high dismissal rates might gradually 
diminish as attorneys and their clients learned to comply with judges’ expectations under 
the new law.  It appears judges and attorneys ably helped filers comply with the new 
requirements from the commencement of the reform period.  Dismissal rates for 
sequential 6-month periods starting with BAPCPA implementation were 10%, 32%, 
26%, and 38%. 
For some bankruptcy filers, case dismissal is a better outcome than following the 
Chapter 13 repayment plan through to discharge.  A dismissal may indicate a household’s 
financial position has improved sufficiently that loan forgiveness is no longer needed.  
With a period of court protection, the automatic stay, many households are able to 
reassume their full financial obligations. 
For other households in bankruptcy, dismissal reflects failure.  Perhaps the 
repayment requirements are excessive.  Depending on available income and the types and 
amounts of debt, a household is required to make consistent payments that usually 
amount to 5% to 20% of the unsecured, potentially-dischargeable debt from which the 
household can seek relief under Chapter 13.  A household that is unable to make 
payments in Chapter 13 bankruptcy may resort to default without court assistance.  That 
situation includes re-exposure to collection efforts and possible wage garnishment. 
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The data indicate a dismissal rate of 71.7% for cases ending in Chapter 13 that 
were filed by a person with a previous bankruptcy within 8 years, compared to 37.5% for 
similar cases filed by someone without a previous bankruptcy in that time frame (t value -
3.51, p = 0.001).  Also, a Chapter 13 case filed by one of the nine households in the 
sample with a garnishment in the past 12 months appears to be more likely to be 
dismissed (77.8% dismissal rate) compared to those without a recent garnishment 
proceeding (51.8%), although the result is not statistically significant for our small 
sample (t value -1.49, p = 0.139).  Households without previous debt collection 
proceedings are more likely to continue to discharge in Chapter 13 cases. 
Norberg (1999) found that dismissed Chapter 13 cases were generally filed by 
debtors who had never previously filed33 and who had less secured debt than people who 
completed their repayment plans.  The latter observation is not contradicted by sample 
data, for which mean real secured debt is 21.7% lower for dismissed Chapter 13 cases 
than for discharged cases, but the corresponding t value is only 1.38 (p = 0.170). 
Chapter 13 cases filed by a divorced, separated, or widowed person have a 68.8% 
dismissal rate, while those who are married or never married have a 48.7% dismissal rate 
(t value 1.46, p = 0.148).  On the other hand, cases filed by households with mortgages 
are less likely to be dismissed.  While only 46.4% of those with mortgages are dismissed, 
65.8% of those without a mortgage are dismissed (t value 1.86, p = 0.066).  Perhaps 
having a home and mortgage is a sign of financial stability suggesting the ability to meet 
repayment requirements, rather than being the mark of a household seeking to catch up 
on arrears and leave bankruptcy before discharge.  
                                                 
33 This finding is contrary to our results and those of Evans and Lown (2008). 





The data present opportunities to explore the characteristics of repeat filers, as 
well as filers’ choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and between joint and separate 
filing status.  Logistic regression analysis is suitable since the dependent variables 
addressed in this section are all binary. 
Previous Bankruptcies 
BAPCPA reform appears to have resulted in fewer bankruptcy filings in Utah by 
people who previously filed for bankruptcy.  The results in Table 5.1 indicate that the 
post-BAPCPA decline in the prevalence of repeat filers (over the 8 years prior to the case 
in within the sample) is significant in all model specifications.  As noted previously (see 
Table 4.11), repeat filings are far more common among Chapter 13 debtors in our sample 
(50.4%) than among Chapter 7 debtors (11.8%).34  The model that best fits the data 
includes bankruptcy chapter and a BAPCPA dummy variable, as well as a variety of 
variables, most of which relate to debt composition, but a few of which reflect household 
demographics and income.
  
                                                 
34 That is to say, over the 8 years previous to the current case, 47% of Chapter 13 filers have at least one 
other bankruptcy, whereas 7% of Chapter 7 filings are not households’ first bankruptcies in 8 years.  
Furthermore, 57% of Chapter 13 filers have a previous filing in the past 20 years, compared to 16% for 
Chapter 7. 
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Table 5.1:  Reform and Repeat Bankruptcy Filings 
Dependent variable is any previous bankruptcy in the past 8 years. 
Odds ratio (p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Post-BAPCPA 





























Children, any = 1   2.900* 
(0.022) 















Credit card debt, 
any = 1 







any = 1 





Debt in collections, 
any = 1 † 













   








   
Unpaid taxes, any = 1 2.297 
(0.052) 
     2.404* 
(0.042) 

























For this regression, the chapter is defined as the chapter a case starts under, even if the filer(s) later converts the case 
to the other chapter. 
* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† Both of these types of debt are given in reference to nonpriority, unsecured debt.  Debt in collections only 
includes this type of debt, and medical debt is given as a percent of nonpriority, unsecured debt. 
‡ The mortgage variable is in thousands of 2005 dollars adjusted for inflation based on the BLS Consumer Price 
Index from the month of filing.  Income is monthly. 
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From the logistic regressions documented in Table 5.1, we learn that larger 
households are more likely to have previously filed for bankruptcy.  Depending on the 
model specification, one more household member increases the odds of a previous 
bankruptcy by 27% to 40%.  Including a binary variable for whether there are children, 
rather than employing the household size variable, makes a noteworthy improvement in 
the likelihood ratio for Model 6, which is higher than the ratio for Model 5 by 5.1.  
However, for other specifications, the binary child variable is not always measurably 
better than household size by that metric, as suggested by the negligible improvement by 
0.2 in the likelihood ratio for Model 3, which includes the presence of any children, 
compared to Model 2, which uses household size.  The presence of children and other 
dependents, and the number of household members both reveal the potential need for 
higher expenditures, including the probability of events that trigger bankruptcy, such as 
divorce and health problems.  In the sample, 56.5% of married filers report that one 
spouse earns no income; an increase in household size often does not imply more 
earnings or income stability. 
Households with a mortgage are significantly less likely to have a previous 
bankruptcy.  The home ownership variable was significant in rather limited model 
specifications (not shown), always inversely related to the presence of previous 
bankruptcies, but having a mortgage is a better indicator.  Households with mortgages 
appear to have enjoyed a greater measure of financial stability in the past compared to 
households without mortgages.  Homeowners with mortgages are more likely than people 
without mortgages to be facing bankruptcy for the first time. 
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People with some debt in collections or some payday loans are more likely to 
have a previous bankruptcy filing.  It appears nonrepeat filers are more likely to access 
bankruptcy assistance before defaulting outside bankruptcy or resorting to exorbitantly 
priced credit sources.  Having payday and collections debt indicate greater financial 
desperation and/or a lack of financial prudence.  Of the two, loans in collections are far 
more common: 61.2% of filers have loans in collections, versus 10.7% of filers with 
payday loans (see Table 4.18).  However, the payday loans variable has higher odds 
ratios and lower p-values, indicating a stronger relationship to previous filings than the 
collections variable. 
A few other debt types are important to this analysis.  A higher percentage of 
medical debt (defined as a percent of unsecured, nonpriority debt) is an excellent 
predictor of repeat filing status under most model specifications.  Repeat filers are often 
those with health care needs that exceed their resources.  Perhaps unexpected, filers with 
some credit card debt (84% of the sample) are less likely to be entering bankruptcy after 
their first time.  This relationship is robust and pronounced, with odds ratios not 
exceeding 0.22 in the models shown in Table 5.1.  Finally, having unpaid taxes is 
probably related to having a bankruptcy filing in the past 8 years.  The odds of having a 
previous filing are over twice as high for filers with tax bills outstanding, but the result is 
not statistically significant at the 0.05 level for all model specifications. 
Income is significant to the likelihood of previous bankruptcies, but only when 
the variable for bankruptcy chapter is removed: income is higher for Chapter 13 filers and 
filers with previous bankruptcies.  Specifically, Chapter 13 filers in our sample have 
95.1% higher real median income than Chapter 7 filers in our sample, $3,368 versus 
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$1,726 per month in 2005 dollars.  Bankruptcy chapter is used without income in all 
specifications shown in this section.  However, one income source was found to be 
significant under certain model specifications: alimony income as a binary variable. 
To summarize, repeat filers are households with children, high medical debt, and 
perhaps alimony obligations.  They generally do not own homes or have mortgages.  
They are likely to file under Chapter 13 to attempt partial repayment. 
Chapter Choice at Filing 
BAPCPA was designed to influence certain bankruptcy filers to choose Chapter 
13 over Chapter 7, an emphasis which is generally favorable to creditors and consistent 
with increased debtor responsibility in bankruptcy.  As explained earlier, Chapter 13 
requires partial repayment over 3 to 5 years before discharging debt, while Chapter 7 
liquidates all nonexempt assets (there are none in most bankruptcy cases) and discharges 
debt not paid by proceeds from asset sales.  Since BAPCPA, a means test prevents some 
people with higher incomes from choosing Chapter 7.  Figure 5.1 indicates some recent 
success in steering filers towards Chapter 13.  The mean percent of Chapter 13 cases out 
of all consumer bankruptcy cases rose from 27.6% in the 4 years before BAPCPA 
implementation to 35.7% in the 4 years after, a difference that yields a significant t value 
of 3.72. 
Exploratory linear univariate regressions give rise to various significant predictors 
of the percent of states’ 2006 consumer bankruptcy filings that are Chapter 13.  More 
consumer bankruptcies are filed in states where Chapter 13 cases are more common.  
Chapter 13 cases are more common in states with low marriage rates and high 
  89 
  
 
Figure 5.1:  Chapter 13 Filings, Percent of Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 
Utah, 1984-2012 
proportions of divorced, separated, and widowed persons.  Household size, median age, 
and home ownership rates do not seem to have any effect on chapter choice.  States with 
more of its population having graduated from college appears likely to have lower filing 
rates, but the result is not significant.  Poverty and unemployment are significant and 
positive, but the result weakens considerably when we control for the filing rate.  Health 
insurance, home homeownership, and median income are not significant here to chapter 
choice.35  Regression results are shown in Table 5.2. 
The only state policy variable that is significant is the primary residence 
exemption, which is inversely related to the share of Chapter 13 filings, but only if the 
filing rate is omitted from the regression.  If these variables do not conclusively reveal the 
                                                 
35 Domowitz and Sartain 1999 find substantial medical debt (more than 2% of income) makes the choice of 
Chapter 7 over Chapter 13 significantly more likely. 
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Table 5.2:  Chapter 13 Cases as a Percent of All Consumer Bankruptcy Filings as 






with Bank. Filing Rate 
 
Consumer Bankruptcy Filing Rate 3.116* 
(<0.001) 
-- 
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State Garnishment Restrictions Limit 





Exemption for Personal Property of a 





Exemption for Primary Residence of a 









* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† These four variables are from Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) for 2000, except unlimited primary 
residence exemptions are entered as $250,000. 
‡ Public Safety Net equals total state spending on Unemployment Insurance, Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families, Food Stamps and Medicaid divided by the number of people in poverty. 
 
  
  92 
  
impact of policy, yet we know households do not choose the chapter under which they 
will file independently.  Besides the requirements of federal bankruptcy code and state 
policies, local legal culture is highly influential on chapter selection, and bankruptcy 
jurisdictions often do not correspond to state boundaries on a one-to-one basis (Braucher, 
1993).  Bankruptcy judges issue rules and together with trustees communicate 
expectations to attorneys regarding what types of filings are acceptable under Chapters 7 
and 13, among other things.  Absent a principal-agent problem, debtors with their 
attorneys navigate codified and unspoken parameters to do what is in debtors’ perceived 
best interest.36  The resulting behavior lines up with a variety of income, debt, and 
demographic variables as we will see in the regression from the Utah sample that follows. 
Turning to regressions from our sample of 200 debtors, the models in Table 5.3 
provide further basis for discussion of which debtors end up in each chapter.  We 
consider repeat filing status, debt composition, income, employment status, and 
household demographics.  Of the 54 households in our sample with at least one previous 
bankruptcy in the past 8 years, 47 or 87.0% chose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 for the 
current filing.  The shorter minimum waiting period between bankruptcies for Chapter 13 
(compared to the waiting period for Chapter 7) is a binding constraint for many such 
households.  Having a previous bankruptcy is the most important factor leading to a 
Chapter 13 filing, as indicated by odds ratios above 10 for this variable. 
                                                 
36 One possible scenario for a principal-agent problem interrelates with local legal culture.  The Utah court 
sets a limit for what attorneys can charge their clients for a standard bankruptcy filing.  The limits differ by 
chapter, being much higher for Chapter 13.  If these produce different profit rates, attorneys may steer their 
clients towards the more profitable chapter, even if the court would have permitted the household to file 
under either chapter. 
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Table 5.3:  Chapter Choice 
Dependent Variable:  Chapter 13 = 1, Chapter 7 = 0 
Odds ratio (p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Previous bankruptcy, 



























Student loans percent ‡ 39.278* 
(0.016) 
   64.267* 
(0.010) 
Spouse has income = 1    2.917* 
(0.007) 
 
Self-employed = 1     18.587* 
(0.044) 
Household size     0.705* 
(0.015) 

















* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† Income is monthly in thousands of 2005 dollars adjusted for inflation based on the BLS Consumer 
Price Index from the month of filing. 
‡ Secured debt and student loans are given as percentages of total debt, including both secured and 
unsecured loans. 
 
Debtors with a higher percentage of secured debt are more likely to choose 
Chapter 13, where there is no procedure for liquidation of equity held in assets.  Many 
people with mortgage arrears use Chapter 13 for a reprieve to catch up and avoid 
foreclosure, whether or not they continue to achieve discharge.  Most subcategories of 
unsecured debt were not found to significantly affect chapter choice, including medical, 
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payday, and credit card debts, variables evaluated in light of Domowitz and Sartain 
(1999).  However, that study did prompt the appropriate inclusion of student loans as a 
percentage of total debt in our models.  The share of student loans is an excellent 
predictor of Chapter 13 bankruptcy rather than Chapter 7.  Student loans are not 
discharged under either chapter, but the repayment plan under Chapter 13 allows a longer 
reprieve from creditors’ effort to collect student loan debt. 
Employment and income are also important to chapter choice.  We find that 
households with higher income, hence more ability to repay some of their loans, have 
122% to 200% greater odds of choosing Chapter 13, per thousand dollars in monthly 
inflation-adjusted income.  Households with a spouse contributing income are more 
likely to choose Chapter 13.  Besides raising household income, having multiple income 
sources makes income less volatile over the repayment period.  Nonetheless, the presence 
of spousal earnings is not significant once we include monthly income.  The total amount 
of income matters more to chapter choice than the particular source does.  Finally, self-
employed debtors may be more likely to choose Chapter 13.37 
Household characteristics like marital status, number of dependents, and job 
tenure are not significant to chapter choice once we control for debt and income 
variables.  For example, a married filer is more likely to choose Chapter 13 than Chapter 
7 (odds ratio = 2.645, p = 0.001) if marital status is the only independent variable in a 
logit model of chapter choice.  However, once we add debt, previous bankruptcy, and, 
particularly, income variables, marital status is no longer significant (see Models 2 and 3, 
                                                 
37 Eight self-employed filers under either chapter in our sample is too small a number upon which to rely 
for results, although the odds ratio and p-value are intriguing. 
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Table 5.3).  Model 4 indicates that the contribution of at least some spousal income 
(n=56) is more important than the mere presence of a spouse (n=108) in terms of the odds 
ratios for those two variables, as well as the likelihood ratios for Models 2 and 4.  Also 
noteworthy, a dummy variable for BAPCPA reform was not significant in any model 
specification attempted (none shown).  Although a smaller share of filers selected 
Chapter 13 since BAPCPA implementation, those who choose it seem to do so for 
essentially the same reasons as before.  Financial characteristics, such as income and debt 
composition (secured versus unsecured) matter most to chapter choice, with higher 
income households with more secured debt choosing Chapter 13.  Model fit with a 
parsimonious number of independent variables is quite good (see Models 1 and 5). 
Model 5 in Table 5.3 shows that larger households are less likely to file Chapter 
13 bankruptcy than Chapter 7.  In a univariate regression, however, household size is 
positively related to choosing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 (odds ratio = 1.242, p-value = 
0.008).  The second result, not shown in Table 5.3, accords with Lown and Rowe’s 
(2003) finding for chapter choice without control variables, while the contrary result from 
Model 5 indicates the merits of this multivariate analysis.  Controlling for higher levels of 
income and secured debt, larger households prefer Chapter 7.  One reason is large 
households are less likely to have home equity they would need to protect from Chapter 7 
liquidation.38  Households with one or two members (n=92) have mean net equity in their 
homes of $3,980, while households with three or more members (n=104) have -$863 in 
equity.  Another reason for filers with larger household sizes to file Chapter 7 cases is 
                                                 
38 Not shown in Table 5.3, home equity makes Chapter 13 significantly more likely than Chapter 7, but 
only at the 0.10 level, when substituted for household size in Model 5. 
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that larger households are held to more lenient income and spending restrictions, 
especially since BAPCPA implementation with means testing. 
In general, these results substantiate the research of Domowitz and Sartain (1999) 
for a sample of 1980 filers in five jurisdictions outside of Utah.  That study used similar 
data to determine that the following variables increase the probability a household will 
choose Chapter 13 bankruptcy over Chapter 7: having a previous bankruptcy filing, being 
married, having employment, owning a home, having more home and auto equity as a 
percent of income, and owing more in student loans as a percent of income.  We tested 
for previous filings and marital status directly with similar results, albeit less conclusive 
for marital status.  We did not find employment to be significant in most model 
specifications (not shown), although it is significant in a univariate regression.  Home 
ownership was significant and positive in a variety of models, but since the percent of 
debt that was secured provided slightly more explanatory power, the secured debt 
measure was preferred.  Not shown, home and auto equity as a percent of income was 
significant in a variety of model specifications at the 0.10 level.  As noted above, student 
loans as a percent of debt was a significant variable in our regressions, while student 
loans as a percent of income was significant for Domowitz and Sartain (1999), but not in 
any models we attempted (not shown). 
Lown and Rowe (2003) analyzed differences between Chapter 7 and 13 filers for 
a sample of households that filed bankruptcy cases in Utah in 1997.  Based on descriptive 
statistics, their study reports that Chapter 13 debtors compared to Chapter 7 filers have 
somewhat larger families (means of 3.3 and 2.8, respectively), are twice as likely to have 
a mortgage (40.0% versus 20.1%), pay more each month for housing (medians of $490 
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and $600), carry 30.2% more in total debt, and have twice as much secured debt (exact 
amounts not reported).  Confirming their results, we find all of these variables are 
positively correlated based on Pearson’s coefficients.  Our variables for income and 
secured debt subsume most of the story of family size, presence of a mortgage, housing 
expenses, and total and secured debt. 
Whether Married Couples File Jointly 
Of 108 married bankruptcy petitions in our sample, 36 were not joint filings.  The 
seminal study of debtors in consumer bankruptcy found—mostly based on deductive 
reasoning before marital status was reported on bankruptcy documents—that it would be 
rare for a married individual filing in 1981 under competent legal advice to choose to file 
alone (Sullivan et al., 1989).  Our data indicate this phenomenon is fairly common more 
than two decades later.  Married individuals may prefer to file separately for a variety of 
reasons.  Spouses retain varying degrees of financial independence.  A couple with 
separate credit accounts from before or during the marriage may strategically protect the 
credit record of one spouse.  Bankruptcy law’s allowances for married debtors may not 
always be deemed sufficiently valuable.  Also, filing alone preserves the option of the 
other spouse filing at a later time before the stipulated waiting period ends for the first 
spouse filing alone. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to file a joint bankruptcy petition, as did two-
thirds of the married couples in our sample.  Spouses are often jointly liable for debts, 
particularly mortgages, such that the discharge of one co-debtor would not free the other 
from payment obligations or collections efforts.  Joint filers receive higher exemptions 
for assets when it comes to liquidation.  For example, the exemption from liquidation for 
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home equity under Chapter 7 doubles from $20,000 for an individual to $40,000 for a 
married couple filing jointly.  Under Chapter 13, court allowances for debtors’ expenses 
are more permissive for married couples, allowing them to keep more of their income and 
reducing the portion due the trustee for creditor payments. 
Logistic regressions for the married filers in our sample reveal certain 
characteristics of those who file jointly, primarily debt composition, home ownership, 
and household size.  Married bankruptcy filers with a home (see Table 5.4) or a mortgage 
(not shown) are significantly more likely to file jointly than those without a home or 
mortgage.39  Fully 78.1% of married home owners file jointly, compared to 56.8% of 
married filers who do not own homes.  The higher home exemption for joint couples may 
help explain the positive connection between home ownership and joint filings. 
The measures of secured and total debt included in regressions are clearly 
associated with home ownership.40  Secured debt represents assets used as collateral, 
particularly homes, but also automobiles and other possessions.  Among other reasons for 
a higher probability of joint filings as either debt variable rises, loans with collateral or 
large values are more likely to be signed by both spouses. 
In the sample, 89.8% of married filers report at least some medical debt.  All but 3 
of the 10 filings without medical were joint.  The modest number of observations for the 
any medical debt variable affects our confidence in the sizeable odds ratios observed in 
each specification. 
                                                 
39 Home ownership was a slightly better predictor of joint status for married couples than the presence of a 
mortgage.  The p-values for the mortgage variable in a model specification not shown in Table 5.4 are 
0.021 for a univariate regression and 0.023 with the medical debt variable added. 
40 None of these three variables included once each in Models 1-3 result in a substantially different 
likelihood ratio compared to the others.  Their explanatory power appears to be comparable, although the 
odds ratios are not easily compared since two are continuous variables with different units. 
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Table 5.4:  Whether to File Bankruptcy Jointly if Married 
Odds ratio (p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homeowner = 1 3.234* 
(0.012) 
   
Total debt, real, 


























Household size    1.343* 
(0.049) 
Likelihood ratio Chi-









* This result is significant at the 0.05 level; Pr(mean before = mean after) is less than 0.05. 
† Total secured and unsecured debt is adjusted for inflation from the month of filing to 2005 
values based on the BLS Consumer Price Index and divided by 100,000. 
‡ This variable indicates whether either spouse receives income from Social Security or any other 
government programs. 
 
Nineteen married couples are among the 30 households in our sample who 
received some form of government income assistance.  While total income was not 
significant at the 0.05 level when included with any combination of the variables in Table 
5.4, the receipt of any income from a government program was consistently a good 
predictor of joint filing status.  Regarding one other income source, the presence of any 
earnings from a spouse was significant at the 0.10 level when added to Model 1, 
suggesting couples with two wage earners are more likely to file bankruptcy together. 
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Household size is significant when added to Models 2 and 3, but in each case, its 
inclusion reduces the debt variables’ significance to the 0.10 level.  Model 4 in Table 5.4, 
regarding the percent of secured debt, illustrates one of these cases.  When household size 
is added to Model 1, the home ownership variable loses significance, and the p-value for 
household size is 0.051.  The odds ratio is quite stable at 1.34 in all specifications.  We 
conclude that household size is positively related to the choice to file jointly, although 
part of its importance lies in its association with measures of debt and home ownership, 
which are larger and more likely, respectively, for large households. 
The likelihood of joint petitions might be expected to vary by chapter since the 
benefits of filing jointly are different for repayment versus liquidation.  In particular, joint 
exemptions should matter more under Chapter 7.  Therefore, we might expect Chapter 7 
cases would have more joint petitions than Chapter 13.  However, of married Chapter 7 
filers, 58.1% file jointly, whereas 72.3% of Chapter 13 filers file jointly, a result whose t 
statistic of -1.53 is not significant.  Perhaps married couples are more likely than single 
filers to be able to report enough income to fund a satisfactory repayment plan, a 
mechanism that would encourage joint filings under Chapter 13 more than Chapter 7.  
The chapter variable was not significant in any model specification. 
The goodness of fit for our models of the decision to file jointly are not as 
impressive as for the repeat bankruptcy and chapter choice models, as indicated by 
likelihood ratios that do not rise far above 20 in the joint filing model.  While a larger 
sample size would aid somewhat in this regard, whether married couples file jointly is 
likely also based on considerations not captured by the range of financial and household 
characteristics available from the sample.  





Consumer debt burdens have risen steadily since the early 1990s, accompanied by 
default and bankruptcy rates that troubled creditors, debtors, and policy makers alike.  In 
response, federal bankruptcy reform, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Prevention Act (BAPCPA) implemented October 2005, reduced the 
attractiveness of bankruptcy to households through a variety of measures that raised their 
costs and limited debt forgiveness.  Subsequently, the bankruptcy filing rate in the U.S. 
fell dramatically.  Indebtedness, delinquency, and macroeconomic conditions do not 
account for the sudden change in the filing rate that accompanied BAPCPA 
implementation.  The resurgence of bankruptcy filings in the U.S. under BAPCPA, which 
has since subsided somewhat, was associated with extraordinarily high delinquency and 
foreclosure rates.  To evaluate impacts of BAPCPA beyond the visible change in the 
filing rate, this study introduces a unique dataset of Utah bankruptcy filers that reveals 
changing consumer characteristics and outcomes during the bankruptcy process. 
Compared to the rest of the country in 2005, Utah had a higher percentage of 
home owners, more household debt per capita, a lower poverty rate, a younger 
population, and higher bankruptcy filing rates.  Utah households are roughly comparable 
to U.S. households in terms of home values, delinquency on auto loans and the 
percentage without health insurance.  Utah’s above-average filing rate can be partially 
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explained by its low income per capita, less public safety net spending, and high 
percentage of Chapter 13 cases compared to other states.  On the other hand, Utah’s low 
unemployment rate, above-average percentage of college-educated adults, and 
garnishment restrictions would tend to reduce the state’s filing rate.  Insights from Utah 
carry a degree of relevance for consumer bankruptcy wherever BAPCPA applies.  This 
project also finds an interesting context for studying incentives, policies, and consumers. 
Bankruptcy and collections policies affect borrowing and default.  Collections 
proceedings and foreclosure often spur debtors to file bankruptcy.  Society’s stance on 
debt collection and forgiveness affects households’ financial opportunities, including 
their willingness to take risks, whether for entrepreneurial investments or nondurable 
consumer goods.  Bankruptcy policy can set a fee sufficient to induce consumer 
responsibility in a theoretical model where probabilistic earning outcomes for debtors are 
affected by household choices, luck, and bankruptcy relief. 
The original dataset created by this research project draws from detailed court 
records for 200 cases from the bankruptcy district of Utah from October 2003 to October 
2007, 24 months before and after BAPCPA implementation.  Compared to the state’s 
general population, households in the bankruptcy sample have lower median income and 
income per capita; more divorced, separated or widowed individuals; smaller household 
size; more poverty; and lower home values and home ownership rates.  The sample 
appears to be similar to those who did not file in terms of home foreclosures and 
employment characteristics. 
Analysis of sample cases from before and after legal reform suggests the contours 
of change, yet with some continuity.  As intended, more of the debtors filing since 
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BAPCPA chose to attempt partial repayment under Chapter 13 rather than seek a Chapter 
7 discharge, which is more generous but more restricted.  Unanticipated, a significantly 
greater share of joint filings were made under both chapters post-BAPCPA.  Debtors and 
their counsel more commonly converted their cases mid-stream from Chapter 7 to 
Chapter 13.  Likewise, significantly more Chapter 13 cases were converted to Chapter 7.  
Mean job tenure declined among postreform filers during a period of falling 
unemployment.  Households entering bankruptcy after October 2005 were more often the 
subject of at least one debt collection proceeding (e.g., garnishment or repossession) in 
the past year.  During the 2 years after BAPCPA, significantly fewer bankruptcy filers 
under Chapter 7 had previously filed for bankruptcy, compared to filers before its 
implementation.  However, we discovered a significant jump in repeat bankruptcies 
during the 5 years following the filing in our sample.  The number of dependents and 
household size increased post-BAPCPA, particularly under Chapter 7.  As a share of 
nonpriority, unsecured claims, medical debt rose and credit card debt fell for cases filed 
under BAPCPA compared to before.  It also appears that more nonpriority, unsecured 
claims were in collection postreform.41  Other developments in Utah for households in 
bankruptcy vary by chapter. 
Chapter 7 filers under the new law were more likely than pre-BAPCPA filers to 
have at least some nonexempt assets the court could receive on behalf of creditors.  
Within that chapter, postreform real income at the time of filing and reported 
                                                 
41 The increase in debt within collections is significant at the 0.10 level (p-value = 0.069). 
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expenditures were significantly higher.  Since the reform, more Chapter 7 cases were 
dismissed, and a prompt discharge under that chapter became less routine.42 
Compared to households in prereform Chapter 13 cases, Chapter 13 filers under 
BAPCPA carried less secured debt as a share of total debt and probably less secured debt 
as a percent of income, as somewhat fewer households in the postreform sample were 
home owners.43  Although Chapter 13 repayment periods were lengthened after the 
reform and new scrutiny over the amount of disposable income was brought to bear, there 
was no increase in repayment amounts in dollar terms and no significant rise in the 
percent repaid of debt outstanding upon filing.44  The framers of BAPCPA intended to 
increase creditor repayments where possible, and the reform was viewed as being more 
favorable to secured creditors than unsecured creditors, although payments of secured 
debt under Chapter 13 did not see a significant rise. 
BAPCPA certainly did not change everything.  Under its provisions, households 
resorting to bankruptcy still have much lower incomes, less wealth, and more debt than 
the general population.  Mean household income and expenditures under Chapter 13 were 
unaffected by the reform, and income within that chapter remained higher than for 
Chapter 7.  The value of assets in Chapter 7 cases scarcely rose postreform, and as 
before, did not approach the value of assets owned by Chapter 13 filers.  Since before 
bankruptcy reform, filers had lower levels of educational attainment compared to the 
                                                 
42 The result for Chapter 7 dismissal and discharge is from a complete sample of cases during the period 
our 200-case sample covers, whereas the smaller sample only captured four Chapter 7 dismissals, 
insufficient to make such conclusions. 
43 The p-value for the difference in means for the secured-debt-to-income ratio and home ownership under 
Chapter 7 are 0.089 and 0.057, respectively.  Both are significant only at the 0.10 level, whereas the 
decrease in the percentage of debt that is secured is significant at the 0.05 level. 
44 The medians for debt repaid and debt repaid as a percent of debt outstanding both decreased.  Mean 
repayment as a percent of total debt increased somewhat.  Mean debt repaid as a dollar amount decreased. 
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general population.  Households before and after BAPCPA implementation include 
similar percentages of married couples and families with at least one dependent.   
Logit models explore characteristics of repeat filers, filers’ chapter choice, and 
whether married couples file jointly. Compared to those filing for the first time within 8 
years, repeat bankruptcy filers were more likely to have children, mortgages, and medical 
debt.  BAPCPA appears to have successfully reduced repeat filings, even controlling for 
a variety of variables.  Turning to the chapter choice model, self-employed repeat 
bankruptcy filers in large households with an income-earning spouse tended to prefer 
Chapter 13 over Chapter 7.  More income and a higher percentage of debt held in student 
loans and secured debt are also associated with choosing Chapter 13.  As for filing jointly 
or individually, married filers with higher levels of debt, particularly medical and secured 
debt, are more likely to file jointly.  Large household size and government assistance as 
an income source are also correlated with married couples choosing to file jointly.  Joint 
filings were less common for married bankruptcy filers after BAPCPA reform than 
before. 
BAPCPA implementation has also been associated with a marked increase in 
attorney fees, a modest hike in court fees, and new expenses for mandatory pre-
bankruptcy debt counseling.  Case duration lengthened under both chapters.  The law 
created legal costs and procedural burdens that reinforce incentives for people to be 
financially responsible, if in their circumstances they are capable of such autonomy.  On 
the other hand, the law withdrew support from those seeking adequate relief to permit 
them a fresh start financially.  The reform’s direct and indirect fees especially affect low-
income debtors, while means testing targets higher-income debtors’ ability to pay.  To the 
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extent people are aware of their default options at the time they make earning and 
spending decisions, BAPCPA has successfully reduced moral hazard in borrowing and 
delinquency.  At the same time, BAPCPA has reduced access to bankruptcy assistance.  
Even with detailed financial disclosure, the court can scarcely detect abuse of the 
bankruptcy system to distinguish a strategic, spendthrift debtor from an unfortunate, 
deserving one—if such a dichotomy even exists. 
At least in the short run, BAPCPA reduced the demand for consumer bankruptcy 
in Utah.  While indebtedness and default did not decline in the U.S. during 2003-2007, 
fewer households opted to use the bankruptcy system to work out their financial 
problems post-BAPCPA.  Confronted with new requirements, a different profile of 
debtors filed under each chapter of consumer bankruptcy.  Though they paid a higher 
price to access bankruptcy and faced a lower discharge rate once they began the process, 
for households that received a discharge, the extent of debt forgiveness was not 
significantly diminished.45  The ongoing impact of bankruptcy policy will be discernible 
in future trends in consumer credit markets and bankruptcy filings, augmented by careful 
analysis of household-level data. 
  
                                                 
45 The percent of debt discharged for completed Chapter 13 cases decreased with BAPCPA, as a somewhat 
greater percentage was repaid, but the change is not significant.  On the other hand, the percent of debt 
discharged in Chapter 7 cases increased with BAPCPA, as the combined amount of student loans and 
priority claims decreased, though this change also was not statistically significant.  It is not clear what the 
overall change in percentage of debt discharged is for both chapters in our sample, but the change is not 
significant. 
 APPENDIX:  BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
This section contains an explanation of bankruptcy law before and after the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCA).  The law, 
which is approximately 196 pages in length, was approved by Congress April 14.  
President George W. Bush signed it April 20 (United States Government Printing Office 
[USGPO], 2005).  Its provisions, except a few as noted in this section, took effect in all 
states October 17, 2005.  The features of BAPCPA selected for inclusion are those that 
were mentioned in detailed reviews of the bill (e.g., Gerdano, 2009; Jacoby, 2005; 
Wedoff, 2005; Yerbich, 2012).  Still, the policy information summarized here comes 
from the bill itself.  Footnotes give references to the legal code and, in many cases, 
relevant excerpts.  The section near the beginning of the dissertation called “The 
Consumer Bankruptcy Process: Chapters 7 and 13” gives an overview to provide context 
for the key provisions of BAPCPA that follow.  With reference to the name of this major 
legislation, the focus rests on abuse prevention without substantive measures to protect 
consumers in bankruptcy, but with intended benefits for solvent consumers who bear the 
indirect costs of others’ bankruptcies. 
BAPCPA reforms can be categorized as either substantive or procedural (White, 
2005).  Substantive changes include who is eligible to file under which chapter and what 
debt can be discharged.  Procedural reforms require credit counseling, attorney 
accountability, and the submission to the court of additional documents, such as tax 
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returns and pay stubs.  In this case, both types of reforms make bankruptcy less attractive 
to a debtor.  Substantive reforms limit debtors’ options, and procedural reforms make the 
process more costly. 
Credit counseling must be completed before submitting any bankruptcy filing. 46  
It may be done by phone or internet.  Prior to BAPCPA, there was no such counseling 
requirement, although the courts themselves have sometimes offered instructions to 
bankruptcy filers before their discharge.   
An income means test is required for Chapter 7 filers with income higher than the 
current state median income for their household size.47  Abuse is presumed if disposable 
income expected over 5 years would exceed 25% of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured 
claims, but the threshold amount must be at least $6,000 and may not exceed $10,000.  
For reference, $6,000 is $100 per month for 5 years, and $10,000 is $167 per month.48  
                                                 
46 Source for credit counseling: BAPCPA § 106 amending US Code Title 11 § 109, with the following 
addition: “an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day 
period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit 
budget and credit counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing (including 
a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit 
counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.” 
 
47 Source for Chapter 7 means test: BAPCPA § 102 amending US Code Title 11 § 707, which states “the 
court…may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter [7]…or, with the debtors 
consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter… 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter.”  Following that statement in paragraph (1), the 
following was added: “In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse 
of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly 
income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not 
less than the lesser of— (I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000, 
whichever is greater; or (II) $10,000.”  Current monthly income is defined in US Code Title 11 § 101 Par. 
10A. 
 
48 The following expression indicates abuse presumed under BAPCPA where true: 60*(monthly income – 
allowed monthly expenses) > MIN($10,000,MAX(0.25(unsecured nonpriority claims),$6,000)).  If 
nonpriority unsecured claims are $24,000 or less, the maximum acceptable disposable income for 5 years is 
$6,000, not less.  If nonpriority unsecured claims are between $24,000 and $40,000, the maximum 
acceptable disposable income is 25% of the total such claims.  If nonpriority unsecured claims are $40,000 
or more, still the maximum acceptable disposable income will not rise above $10,000.  This is intended to 
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Monthly expenses are not just debtor-supplied, but many of them must conform to 
statistically derived national and local standards.  A judge may also use other criteria for 
determining if debtor conduct is abuse of bankruptcy law.49  If abuse is found, the judge 
may dismiss the case or give the debtor the option to convert it to Chapter 13. 
Additional paperwork is required.  Within 45 days of filing, to avoid automatic 
dismissal,50 debtors must submit evidence of any payments received from an employer in 
the past 60 days,51 a separate form itemizing monthly net income for the means test 
where applicable, and documentation of any expected increase in income or expenditures 
in the next 12 months.52  Debtors must also submit their most recent income tax return,53 
                                                 
remove households who can afford partial repayment in Chapter 13 from receiving a broad and prompt 
Chapter 7 discharge. 
 
49 Source for other criteria for Chapter 7 abuse besides the means test:  BAPCPA § 102 amending US Code 
Title 11 § 707, to which was added in paragraph (3), “the court shall consider— (A) whether the debtor 
filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of the circumstances … of the debtor’s financial situation 
demonstrates abuse.” 
 
50 Source for 45-day filing deadline: BAPCPA § 315 adding US Code Title 11 § 521 paragraph (i), “if an 
individual debtor in a voluntary case under Chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information required under 
subsection (a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the case shall be automatically 
dismissed effective on the 46th day after the date of the filing of the petition.” 
 
51 Source for evidence of payment from employer filing requirement:  BAPCPA § 314 amending US Code 
Title 11 § 521, to which was added: “The debtor shall—(1) file--…(iv) copies of all payment advices or 
other evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the 
debtor from any employer of the debtor.” 
 
52 Source for monthly net income filing requirement:  BAPCPA § 314 amending US Code Title 11 § 521, 
to which was added the provision that the debtor file “(v) a statement of the amount of monthly net income, 
itemized to show how the amount is calculated; and (vi) a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated 
increase in income or expenditures over the 12-month period following the date of the filing of the 
petition.” 
 
53 Source for most recent income tax return filing requirement:  BAPCPA § 315 amending US Code Title 
11 § 521 with the following addition: “The debtor shall provide--(i)  not later than 7 days before the date 
first set for the first meeting of creditors, to the trustee a copy of the Federal income tax return required 
under applicable law (or at the election of the debtor, a transcript of such return) for the most recent tax 
year ending immediately before the commencement of the case and for which a Federal income tax return 
was filed; and (ii) at the same time the debtor complies with clause (i), a copy of such return (or if elected 
under clause (i), such transcript) to any creditor that timely requests such copy.  (B) If the debtor fails to 
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copies of any tax returns filed during the case,54 and, if requested, a photo ID.55  Since 
before BAPCPA, the following filing requirements were in place: schedules of assets, 
liabilities, current income, and current expenditures, as well as a statement of intention 
regarding property with secured claims attached. 
BAPCPA reform places an increased burden on attorneys for accuracy based on 
requirements for “debt relief agencies,” which include bankruptcy attorneys.56  Debt 
relief agencies must not commit intentional or negligent errors as they assist bankruptcy 
clients.  A debt relief agency may not misrepresent the benefits and risks of filing for 
bankruptcy, and they must refrain from advising clients to incur debt to file for 
bankruptcy.  They cannot provide information or advise their clients to provide 
information that with “exercise of reasonable care, should have been known by such 
                                                 
comply with clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), the court shall dismiss the case unless the debtor 
demonstrates that the failure to so comply is due to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor.” 
 
54 Source for any new income tax return filing requirement: BAPCPA § 315 adding US Code Title 11 §521 
paragraph (f), “At the request of the court, the United States trustee, or any party in interest in a case under 
chapter 7, 11, or 13, a debtor who is an individual shall file with the court— (1) at the same time filed with 
the taxing authority, a copy of each Federal income tax return required under applicable law (or at the 
election of the debtor, a transcript of such tax return) with respect to each tax year of the debtor ending 
while the case is pending under such chapter,” including any late filings for previous years and any 
amendments. 
 
55 Source for photo ID filing requirement: BAPCPA § 315 adding US Code Title 11 § 521 paragraph (h), 
“If requested by the United States trustee or by the trustee, the debtor shall provide— (1) a document that 
establishes the identity of the debtor, including a driver’s license, passport, or other document that contains 
a photograph of the debtor; or (2) such other personal identifying information relating to the debtor that 
establishes the identity of the debtor.” 
 
56 Source for bankruptcy attorneys being debt relief agencies:  BAPCPA § 226 which adds to US Code 
Title 11 § 101 definitions (12A) “The term ‘debt relief agency’ means any person who provides any 
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer…”  and (4A) “The term ‘bankruptcy assistance’ 
means any goods or services sold or otherwise provided to an assisted person with the express or implied 
purpose of providing information, advice, counsel, document preparation, or filing, or attendance at a 
creditors’ meeting or appearing in a case or proceeding on behalf of another or providing legal 
representation with respect to a case or proceeding under this title.”  
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agency to be untrue or misleading.”57  An attorney who signs a client’s bankruptcy 
petition certifies to have “no knowledge after an inquiry that the information in the 
schedules…is incorrect.”58  Debt relief agencies must provide a new disclosure with 
wording stipulated by law, including the requirement of “reasonable inquiry” for values 
provided of assets, liabilities, and income.59  Consequences and procedures for violations 
of the new law by debt relief agencies are explained.60  Professionalism has always been 
expected of attorneys, but the expectation to verify and vouch for the accuracy of clients’ 
statements represents a higher standard.  The attorney general is made responsible to 
                                                 
57 Source for debt relief agency restrictions:  BAPCPA § 227 which adds to US Code Title 11 § 526 these 
restrictions “(a) A debt relief agency shall not— (1) fail to perform any service that such agency informed 
an assisted person or prospective assisted person it would provide in connection with a case or proceeding 
under this title; (2) make any statement, or counsel or advise any assisted person or prospective assisted 
person to make a statement in a document filed in a case or proceeding under this title, that is untrue and 
misleading, or that upon the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known by such agency to be 
untrue or misleading; (3) misrepresent to any assisted person or prospective assisted person, directly or 
indirectly, affirmatively or by material omission, with respect to— (A) the services that such agency will 
provide to such person; or (B) the benefits and risks that may result if such person becomes a debtor in a 
case under this title; or (4) advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in 
contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition 
preparer fee or charge for services performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case 
under this title.” 
 
58 Source for attorney verification expectation: BAPCPA § 102 amending US Code § 707 paragraph (b) (4) 
(D) with the following addition, “The signature of an attorney on the petition shall constitute a certification 
that the attorney has no knowledge after an inquiry that the information in the schedules filed with such 
petition is incorrect.” 
 
59 Source for the new item of disclosure: BAPCPA § 228 amending US Code Title 11 § 527 with this 
addition: “A debt relief agency…shall provide…a clear and conspicuous written notice…that-- (A) all 
information that the assisted person is required to provide with a petition and thereafter during a case under 
this title is required to be complete, accurate, and truthful; (B) all assets and all liabilities are required to be 
completely and accurately disclosed in the documents filed to commence the case, and the replacement 
value of each asset as defined in section 506 must be stated in those documents where requested after 
reasonable inquiry to establish such value; (C) current monthly income, the amounts specified in section 
707(b)(2), and, in a case under chapter 13 of this title, disposable income (determined in accordance with 
section 707(b)(2)), are required to be stated after reasonable inquiry; and (D) information that an assisted 
person provides during their case may be audited pursuant to this title, and that failure to provide such 
information may result in dismissal of the case under this title or other sanction, including a criminal 
sanction.” 
 
60 Consequences and procedures of violations by debt relief agencies are found in BAPCPA § 227 which 
adds to US Code Title 11 § 526, particularly paragraph (c). 
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conduct random audits of at least 1 in 250 bankruptcy cases to verify their accuracy 
beginning April 20, 2007.61 
The duration of the automatic stay provision was limited for debtors with recent 
previous bankruptcies.62  The stay only lasts 30 days from the date of filing for debtors 
who filed a previous bankruptcy case that was dismissed in the past year.  Debtors may 
                                                 
61 Source for random audit procedure: BAPCPA § 603 which adds audit procedures instructions to US 
Code Title 28 § 586:  “The Attorney General…and the Judicial Conference of the United States…shall 
establish procedures to determine the accuracy, veracity, and completeness of petitions, schedules, and 
other information that the debtor is required to provide under sections 521 and 1322 of title 11, United 
States Code, and, if applicable, section 111 of such title, in cases filed under chapter 7 or 13 of such title in 
which the debtor is an individual. Such audits shall be in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards and performed by independent certified public accountants or independent licensed public 
accountants, provided that the Attorney General and the Judicial Conference, as appropriate, may develop 
alternative auditing standards not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act [Apr. 20, 2005].  
(2) Procedures. - Those procedures required by paragraph (1) shall - (A) establish a method of selecting 
appropriate qualified persons to contract to perform those audits; (B) establish a method of randomly 
selecting cases to be audited, except that not less than 1 out of every 250 cases in each Federal judicial 
district shall be selected for audit; (C) require audits of schedules of income and expenses that reflect 
greater than average variances from the statistical norm of the district in which the schedules were filed if 
those variances occur by reason of higher income or higher expenses…; and (D) establish procedures for 
providing, not less frequently than annually, public information concerning the aggregate results of such 
audits..." 
 
62 Source for the limitation on automatic stay for previous filers:  BAPCPA § 302 amending US Code Title 
11 § 362, to which was added the following, referring to a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy: “if a single 
or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, other than a 
case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)— (A) the stay under 
subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with 
respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later 
case; (B) on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic stay and upon notice and a 
hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases as to any or all creditors … only if the party in 
interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed; and (C) 
for purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith (but such presumption 
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary)— (i) as to all creditors, if— (I) more 
than 1 previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in which the individual was a debtor was pending 
within the preceding 1-year period; (II) a previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in which the 
individual was a debtor was dismissed within such 1-year period, after the debtor failed to— (aa) file or 
amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial excuse … ; 
(bb) provide adequate protection as ordered by the court; or (cc) perform the terms of a plan confirmed by 
the court; or (III) there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor 
since the dismissal of the next most previous case under chapter 7, 11, or 13 or any other reason to 
conclude that the later case will be concluded— 
(aa) if a case under chapter 7, with a discharge; or (bb) if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed 
plan that will be fully performed…” 
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make a motion to have the stay extended beyond 30 days if their previous case was not 
dismissed due to their own negligence, and if they demonstrate “substantial change in … 
financial or personal affairs.”  Before BAPCPA, the automatic stay was in force for the 
duration of a bankruptcy case. 
The minimum waiting period for repeat filers that received a prior discharge was 
lengthened for some sequences of repeat filings.  A Chapter 7 discharge will not be 
granted if at least 8 years (lengthened from 6 years) have not passed between any 
previous Chapter 7 filing and the current Chapter 7 filing.63  BAPCPA created minimum 
waiting periods for Chapter 13 cases, whereas before there were none.  Before filing 
under Chapter 13, debtors must wait at least 4 years from any previous Chapter 7 filing 
and at least 2 years from any previous Chapter 13 filing.64  Unchanged, a Chapter 7 
discharge will not be granted unless at least 6 years have passed between any previous 
Chapter 13 filings and the filing date of the present Chapter 7 case.65  Conversion before 
discharge to a different bankruptcy chapter is still permitted. 
                                                 
63 Source for waiting period since previous Chapter 7 filing for Chapter 7 discharge:  BAPCPA § 312 
revised US Code Title 11 § 727 which now uses the number eight instead of six in this part:  “(a) The court 
shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless— … (8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this 
section, under section 1141 of this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case 
commenced within 8 years before the date of the filing of the petition;” 
 
64 Source for waiting period for Chapter 13 discharge:  BAPCPA § 312 added the following as US Code 
Title 11 § 1328 paragraph (f):  “the court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for in the plan or 
disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received a discharge-- (1) in a case filed under chapter 7, 11, 
or 12 of this title during the 4-year period preceding the date of the order for relief [automatic stay 
commenced at filing] under this chapter, or 2) in a case filed under chapter 13 of this title during the 2-year 
period preceding the date of such order.” 
 
65 Source for waiting period since previous Chapter 13 filing for Chapter 7 discharge:  US Code Title 11 § 
727 paragraph (a) (9) 
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Chapter 13 repayment plan length is specified at 3 years (unless the court has 
cause to approve a longer repayment period) for debtors with income below the state 
median income for their household size.66  The plan must be exactly 5 years for debtors 
with income equal to or greater than the state median income for their household size.  
Plans are only shorter if all allowed unsecured claims are paid in full, which means that 
all secured claims must be caught up, and all priority claims must be paid first, since 
unsecured claims are the last to be paid in a repayment plan.67  Before BAPCPA, if the 
trustee or unsecured creditor objected to the plan, the debtor could be required to pay all 
disposable income for 3 years into the plan, unless all claims were paid off sooner.68  
Also before BAPCPA, there was a limit on repayment plan duration of 3 years, unless the 
                                                 
66 Source for Chapter 13 plan repayment period length, prescribing limits of 3 or 5 years: BAPCPA § 318 
adding the following to US Code Title 11 § 1322 (d), “(1) If the current monthly income of the debtor and 
the debtor’s spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than— (A) in the case of a debtor in a 
household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State for 1 earner; (B) in the case of a 
debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the applicable State for 
a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or (C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 
individuals, the highest median family income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, 
plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of 4, the plan may not provide for payments over a 
period that is longer than 5 years.  (2) If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse 
combined, when multiplied by 12, is less than [the applicable median income] the plan may not provide for 
payments over a period that is longer than 3 years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but 
the court may not approve a period that is longer than 5 years.” 
 
67 Source for Chapter 13 plan repayment period length, prescribing standard length of 3 or 5 years: 
BAPCPA § 318 adding the following to US Code Title 11 § 1325 paragraph (b) (4), the `applicable 
commitment period'— (A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be-- (i) 3 years; or (ii) not less than 5 years, if 
the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not 
less than— [the applicable median income]; and (B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable 
under subparagraph (A), but only if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims 
over a shorter period.'' 
 
68 Source for Chapter 13 plan repayment period length before BAPCPA, prescribing length of 3 years: US 
Code Title 11 § 1325 (b) (1)  “If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the 
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the 
plan— (A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less 
than the amount of such claim; or (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income 
to be received in the 3-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be 
applied to make payments under the plan.” 
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court demonstrated cause to extend the period to no more than 5 years.  To summarize, 
since BAPCPA, this 3-year provision only applies to cases where household income is 
less than the applicable median family income.69 
Before BAPCPA, Chapter 13 disposable income was more loosely defined as all 
income received minus “reasonably necessary” expenses, specifically allowing for 
charitable contributions and business expenses.  Expenses for this purpose were taken 
from a debtor-reported budget.  Since BAPCPA, income is defined to specifically 
exclude child support payments.  The provisions for charitable contributions and business 
expenses are the same as before, and the “reasonably necessary” standard with a debtor-
reported budget of expenses remains for debtors with income below the applicable state 
median income.70  If a debtor’s income is greater than or equal to the applicable state 
median income, reasonably necessary expenses are more rigorously determined, based on 
standards of allowed expenses.71  Allowed expenses include monthly expenses based on 
amounts specified by IRS standards with some leeway for food and clothing and, in 
certain categories, based on the debtor’s actual expenses.72  Allowed expenses also 
                                                 
69 Source for Chapter 13 plan repayment period length before BAPCPA, prescribing limit of 3 years except 
under certain circumstances: US Code Title 11 § 1322 (d)  “The plan may not provide for payments over a 
period that is longer than 3 years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but the court may 
not approve a period that is longer than 5 years.” 
 
70 The definition of disposable income is found in US Code Title 11 §1325 paragraph (b) (2). 
 
71 Source for disposable income determination for people above the median income:  BAPCPA §319 added 
to US Code Title 11 §1325 paragraph (b) (3), which reads “Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended 
under paragraph (2) shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b) 
(2), if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than— [the applicable median 
income].” 
 
72 Source for definition of monthly expenses: BAPCPA § 102 adds US Code Title 11 § 707 paragraph (b) 
(2) (ii), “The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts 
specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for 
the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in 
which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of the order for relief, for the debtor, the dependents of the 
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include average monthly payments on secured debts for essential items like a home and 
car, and payments for priority claims like child support and alimony.73 
Some debt is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.  Before BAPCPA, certain recent 
purchases over a specified amount were nondischargeable before BAPCPA for Chapter 7 
cases.  BAPCPA extends the time periods considered “recent,” lowers the threshold 
                                                 
debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if the spouse is not otherwise a dependent. Such 
expenses shall include reasonably necessary health insurance, disability insurance, and health savings 
account expenses for the debtor, the spouse of the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor. Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any payments for 
debts. In addition, the debtor’s monthly expenses shall include the debtor’s reasonably necessary expenses 
incurred to maintain the safety of the debtor and the family of the debtor from family violence … In 
addition, if it is demonstrated that it is reasonable and necessary, the debtor’s monthly expenses may also 
include an additional allowance for food and clothing of up to 5 percent of the food and clothing categories 
as specified by the National Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service. (II) In addition, the debtor’s 
monthly expenses may include, if applicable, the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are 
reasonable and necessary for care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household member 
or member of the debtor’s immediate family (including parents, grandparents, siblings, children, and 
grandchildren of the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case who is 
not a dependent) and who is unable to pay for such reasonable and necessary expenses. (III) In addition, for 
a debtor eligible for chapter 13, the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual administrative 
expenses of administering a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor resides, up to an amount of 
10 percent of the projected plan payments, as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office 
for United States Trustees. (IV) In addition, the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual expenses 
for each dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,500 per year per child, to attend a 
private or public elementary or secondary school if the debtor provides documentation of such expenses 
and a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary, and why such expenses are 
not already accounted for in the National Standards, Local Standards, or Other Necessary Expenses 
referred to in subclause (I). (V) In addition, the debtor’s monthly expenses may include an allowance for 
housing and utilities, in excess of the allowance specified by the Local Standards for housing and utilities 
issued by the Internal Revenue Service, based on the actual expenses for home energy costs if the debtor 
provides documentation of such actual expenses and demonstrates that such actual expenses are reasonable 
and necessary.” 
 
73 Source for definition of monthly expenses: BAPCPA § 102 adds US Code Title 11 § 707 paragraphs (b) 
(2) (iii) and (iv), “The debtor’s average monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be calculated 
as the sum of— 
(I) the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 
months following the date of the petition; and (II) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary 
for the debtor, in filing a plan under chapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession of the debtor’s primary 
residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts; divided by 60. (iv) The debtor’s expenses for 
payment of all priority claims (including priority child support and alimony claims) shall be calculated as 
the total amount of debts entitled to priority, divided by 60.” 
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amounts, and applies the provision to Chapter 13 cases as well as Chapter 7 cases.74 
Nondischargeable debts include cash advances of over $750, rather than over $1,225, 
obtained within 70 days of filing, rather than within 60 days.  Nondischargeable debts 
also include luxury goods over $500, rather than over $1,225, obtained within 90 days of 
filing, rather than within 60 days.75  BAPCPA also broadens the scope of debts that are 
nondischargeable under Chapter 13 cases, including certain taxes, debt obtained by fraud 
or false pretenses, civil and criminal restitutions, debt to creditors not given adequate 
notice, which before were only nondischargeable in Chapter 7 cases.76  The definition of 
student loans that are nondischargeable was expanded somewhat by BAPCPA to include 
any qualified education loan besides those associated with a government unit or nonprofit 
institution, which basically includes for-profit lenders.77  BAPCPA gave child support 
                                                 
74 Source for applying cash advance and luxury good purchases to Chapter 13 cases: BAPCPA § 314 adds a 
reference to US Code § 523(a) paragraph (2) among the debts nondischargeable per §1328(a). 
 
75 Source for limitation on discharge of recent cash advances and luxury good purchases: BAPCPA § 310 
changes the amounts and time limits of US Code Title 11 § 523 paragraph (a), which now states, “A 
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt—… (2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or 
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by—… (C)(i) for purposes of subparagraph (A)— (I) consumer 
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for luxury goods or services incurred by an 
individual debtor on or within 90 days before the order for relief under this title are presumed to be 
nondischargeable; and (II) cash advances aggregating more than $750 that are extensions of consumer 
credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 70 days before the order 
for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; and (ii) for purposes of this subparagraph—
…the term ‘luxury goods or services’ does not include goods or services reasonably necessary for the 
support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.” 
 
76 Source for considering additional types of debt nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases: BAPCPA § 314 
adds a reference to US Code § 523(a) paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C), (3), and (4) among the debts 
nondischargeable per §1328(a), and adds these two items, “(3) for restitution, or a criminal fine, included in 
a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime; or (4) for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action 
against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury to an 
individual or the death of an individual.” 
 
77 Source for nondischargeable student loans:  BAPCPA § 220 which revises US Code Title 11 § 523 
paragraph (a) (8), mainly by the addition of subparagraph (B), “unless excepting such debt from discharge 
under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for— 
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or 
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payments higher priority by removing exceptions to domestic support being 
nondischargeable on the basis of ability to pay and detrimental consequences to the 
debtor.78 
BAPCPA substantially raises the filing fee for Chapter 7 cases and slightly lowers 
the filing fee for Chapter 13 cases.  The changes in filing fees made Chapter 13 cases 
relatively cheaper than Chapter 7 cases.  Chapter 7 filing fees were raised from $209 to 
$274 as of October 17, 2005, when Chapter 13 fees were lowered from $194 to $185.79  
Incidentally, fees changed again about a year later when the difference in fees between 
the two was reduced markedly:  Chapter 7 increases modestly to $299, while Chapter 13 
increases to $274. 
Chapter 7 filing fees may be waved for individuals below 150% of poverty line.80  
Before BAPCPA, there was no standard for waiving fees except by special hardship 
petition. 
                                                 
made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or (ii) 
an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or (B) any other 
educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual;”  The IRS Code § 221 definition is very broad, 
available at http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Sec._221. 
 
78 Source for child support being nondischargeable: BAPCPA § 215 amending US Code Title 11 § 523 so 
that discharge under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 does not discharge a debtor from debt, as paragraph (a) (5) 
states simply, “for a domestic support obligation,” and as paragraph (a) (15) states, “to a spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in 
the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other 
order of a court of record, or a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit;” 
 
79 Source for change in filing fees: US Code Title 28 § 1930. 
 
80 Source for new policy on waiving the filing fee: BAPCPA § 418 which adds US Code Title 28 § 1930 
paragraph (f), “(1) Under the procedures prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
district court or the bankruptcy court may waive the filing fee in a case under chapter 7 of title 11 for an 
individual if the court determines that such individual has income less than 150 percent of the income 
official poverty line (as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, and revised annually in 
accordance with section 673(2) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981) applicable to a family 
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The homestead exemption is limited to $125,000 for any residence purchased 
within 1,215 days (about 40 months), even if the state exemption were higher.81  The 
Utah exemption has been $20,000 for a single filer or $40,000 for joint filers for a 
primary residence; real property that is not a primary residence has a $5,000 exemption 
for single filers or a $10,000 exemption for joint filers.82  The new federal maximum 
homestead exemption does not affect Utah.  Other state exemption limits are $2,500 for 
one automobile per individual and $3,500 for work tools per individual.83  Exemption 
limits did not change between October 2003 and October 2007.  On a related subject, the 
Utah wage garnishment limit of 25% of disposable income has not changed since 1985.84 
Debtors are required to meet domiciliary requirements (to reside within a 
jurisdiction a certain amount of time) in order to be eligible for exemption laws of a 
particular state.  Before BAPCPA, to receive a state’s exemptions, a debtor had to be 
domiciled in a state for 180 days or for more of the previous 180 days than they were 
                                                 
of the size involved and is unable to pay that fee in installments… (2) The district court or the bankruptcy 
court may waive for such debtors other fees prescribed under subsections (b) and (c).” 
 
81 Source for homestead exemption:  BAPCPA § 322 adds the following to US Code Title 11 § 522, “a 
debtor may not exempt any amount of interest that was acquired by the debtor during the 1215-day  period 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition that exceeds in  the aggregate $125,000 in value in-- (A) real 
or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence; (B) a cooperative that 
owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence; (C) a burial plot for the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; or (D) real or personal property that the debtor or dependent of the 
debtor claims as a homestead.” 
 
82 Source for Utah household exemptions is Utah Code Title 78B Chapter 5 Section 503 formerly 78-23-3 
before Feb 2008 recodification.  A May 3, 2004 revision includes mobile homes in the exemption. 
 
83 For exempt household possessions, such as oven, clothes, and beds, see Utah Code Title 78B Chapter 5 
Section 505 formerly 78-23-5.  For exempt work tools and motor vehicles and for value limits of household 
possession exemptions, see Utah Code Title 78B Chapter 5 Section 506 formerly 78-23-8.  A May 2, 2005 
revision specifically exempts life insurance owned by debtor, spouse, or children, except where collateral 
for a loan; the revision also exempts alimony and maintenance payments.  Both life insurance and alimony 
were presumably included as exemptions by less specific language before this time. 
84 See Utah Code Title 70C Chapter 7 Section 103 
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domiciled in any other state.  Under BAPCPA, in order to receive a state’s exemptions, a 
debtor must be domiciled in that state for 730 days (2 years).  If the debtor has not been 
domiciled in the state for 730 days, the law looks to where they were domiciled for the 
majority of the 180 days preceding the previous 730 days.85  Since before BAPCPA, 
Chapter 13 plans were required to provide secured creditors with at least the value of the 
collateral property on the effective date of the plan or be current on a contract-specified 
payment schedule towards that end.  If the claim amount was higher than that property 
value, the unsecured portion of the loan could be paid in the same proportion as other 
unsecured loans, and the secured creditor could not exercise its lien on the property, as 
long as the secured portion of the claim was repaid under the plan.86  BAPCPA retains 
those provisions, but it creates an exception for certain recent purchases.  Secured claims 
on motor vehicles incurred within 910 days (about 30 months) of filing must be paid in 
full, including any unsecured portion, or the creditor’s lien on the vehicle remains.  
Likewise, for any secured claims based on collateral of “any other thing of value” 
                                                 
85 Source for domiciliary requirements for exemptions: BAPCPA § 307 which amends US Code Title 11 § 
522 paragraph (b)(3), which now reads as follows, “any property that is exempt under Federal law, other 
than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the 
petition at the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located at a single 
State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days 
immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other 
place; (B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the 
case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the 
entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law; and (C) retirement 
funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 
403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. If the effect of the domiciliary 
requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may 
elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d).” 
 
86 Source for treatment of secured loans with claim amount above the property value in Chapter 13 cases:  
US Code Title 11 § 1325 paragraph (a) (5) (B) states that one condition for confirmation of a plan is that 
“the plan provides that-- (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed 
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim;” 
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purchased within one year of filing, that secured claim must be paid in full, not just the 
secured portion.87  BAPCPA also defines property value as retail value or replacement 
value.88 
BAPCPA requires certain procedures for notices from debtors to creditors.  For 
example, debtors must obtain the correct address for creditors and include certain 
information like their account numbers in such notices.89 
Debtors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case are required to make adequate 
protection payments to creditors with secured claims of an amount that is intended to 
compensate the creditor for depreciation of the property on which they have a lien until 
regular debt payments resume.90  Before BAPCPA, adequate protection payments to the 
trustee were to commence no later than 30 days after the plan filing, and if a plan were 
not confirmed, adequate protection payments would be returned to the debtor.  Under 
                                                 
87 Source for treatment of secured claims in Chapter 13 cases, exception for recent purchases:  BAPCPA § 
306 adding this paragraph to the end of US Code Title 11 § 1325 paragraph (a), “For purposes of paragraph 
(5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money 
security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910- day 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as 
defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt 
consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.” 
 
88 Source for definition of values: US Code Title 11 § 506 paragraph (a) (2) was added under BAPCPA 
(previously value was not carefully defined), “such value with respect to personal property securing an 
allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of such property as of the date of the 
filing of the petition without deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for 
personal, family, or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant would 
charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is 
determined.” 
 
89 Source for notice requirements: US Code Title 11 § 342 
 
90 Source for definition of adequate protection: unchanged by BAPCPA, US Code Title 11 § 361 “When 
adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an interest of an entity in 
property, such adequate protection may be provided by— (1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment 
or periodic cash payments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, 
or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a 
decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property;” 
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BAPCPA, adequate protection payments are made either directly to the creditor or to the 
trustee, if that is provided in the plan.  Payments commence no later than 30 days of the 
plan filing or an order for relief from stay to the creditor involved, whichever is sooner.  
If a plan is not approved, adequate payment amounts collected so far by the trustee will 
be distributed to secured creditors.91 
Trustee fee limitations did not change with BAPCPA.  The limit is 10% of 
receipts from a repayment plan in a Chapter 13 case,92 and for money from Chapter 7 
liquidations the limit is 25% of the first $5,000 received to 10% for amounts up to 
$50,000 to 5% up to $1 million.93  
                                                 
91 Source for adequate protection procedures: BACPA § 309 adds paragraphs (a) (1) (A) – (C) and revises 
paragraph (a) (2) to US Code Title 11 § 1326, “(a)(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor shall 
commence making payments not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the order for 
relief, whichever is earlier, in the amount— (A) proposed by the plan to the trustee; (B) scheduled in a 
lease of personal property directly to the lessor for that portion of the obligation that becomes due after the 
order for relief, reducing the payments under subparagraph (A) by the amount so paid and providing the 
trustee with evidence of such payment, including the amount and date of payment; and (C) that provides 
adequate protection directly to a creditor holding an allowed claim secured by personal property to the 
extent the claim is attributable to the purchase of such property by the debtor for that portion of the 
obligation that becomes due after the order for relief, reducing the payments under subparagraph (A) by the 
amount so paid and providing the trustee with evidence of such payment, including the amount and date of 
payment. (2) A payment made under paragraph (1)(A) shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or 
denial of confirmation. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance 
with the plan as soon as is practicable. If a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return any such payments 
not previously paid and not yet due and owing to creditors pursuant to paragraph (3) to the debtor, after 
deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b).” 
 
92 See 28 U.S.C. 586(e) for trustee fees in Chapter 13 cases. 10% applies to amounts up to $450,000 which 
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